On the Resurrection of the Dead · §2 · Athenagoras

The test for reasonable disbelief

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Athenagoras is laying down the standard that critics of the resurrection must meet if their disbelief is to be reasonable.

Let us consider the matter this way. If any disbelief arises in people not hastily or from some unexamined opinion, but only when it comes with a strong cause and with the certainty that accords with the truth does it preserve the reasonable account—namely, when the very thing disbelieved appears to be unbelievable. For to disbelieve things that are not unbelievable is the work of people who are not using sound judgment about the truth. Therefore those who disbelieve or are perplexed about the resurrection must not declare their opinion about it hastily, according to what merely seems right to them and what pleases the undisciplined. They must either attach no cause at all to the origin of human beings—which is very easy to refute—or, if they attribute the cause of existing things to God, they must look to the foundation of this doctrine and show through it that the resurrection has no credibility anywhere. They will do this if they can demonstrate that it is either impossible for God or unwilled by God to unite again and gather together bodies that have died or been completely dissolved, toward the constitution of the same human beings. If they cannot do this, let them cease from this godless disbelief and from blaspheming what is not right. For it will become clear from what follows that they are not speaking the truth when they say it is impossible or unwilled.

A thing is known to be truly impossible for someone either because he does not know what is going to happen, or because he does not have sufficient power to accomplish well what he knows. For someone who is ignorant of something that must happen could neither raise up nor accomplish at all what he does not know. And someone who knows well what is to be done, and knows from what source and how it could come about, but either has no power at all to do what he knows or does not have sufficient power, would not attempt it in the first place if he were prudent and examined his own power; and if he attempted it recklessly, he would not complete what he had decided.

But it is not possible for God to be ignorant of the nature of the bodies that will be raised, in whole and in every part, nor of where each of the dissolved things goes, and which part of the elements has received what was dissolved and moved toward what is akin to it—even if what has been naturally united again to the whole seems entirely indistinguishable to human beings. For the one who was not ignorant before each thing's own constitution—neither of the nature of the elements that would come to be, from which human bodies are made, nor of the parts of these elements from which he was going to take what seemed good for the constitution of the human body—clearly will not be ignorant after the whole has been dissolved of where each of the things he took for the completion of each body has gone. For as far as concerns the order of things now prevailing among us and our judgment about other things, it is greater to know in advance things that have not yet come to be; but as far as concerns the worth of God and his wisdom, both are natural, and it is equally easy for him to know things that have been dissolved as to know in advance things that have not yet come to be.

Greek

Σκοπῶμεν δὲ οὕτως. Εἰ πᾶσα ἀπιστία μὴ προχείρως καὶ κατά τινα δόξαν ἄκριτον ἐγγινομένη τισίν, ἀλλὰ μετά τινος αἰτίας ἰσχυρᾶς καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλείας· τότε γὰρ τὸν εἰκότα σώζει λόγον, ὅταν αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἀπιστοῦσιν ἄπιστον εἶναι δοκῇ· τὸ γάρ τοι τοῖς οὐκ οὖσιν ἀπίστοις ἀπιστεῖν ἀνθρώπων ἔργον οὐχ ὑγιαινούσῃ κρίσει περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν χρωμένων. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἀπιστοῦντας ἢ διαποροῦντας μὴ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς ἀκρίτως καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀκολάστοις κεχαρισμένον τὴν περὶ ταύτης ἐκφέρειν γνώμην, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἐξάπτειν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεσιν (ὃ δὴ καὶ λίαν ἐστὶν εὐεξέλεγκτον), ἢ τῷ θεῷ τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀνατιθέντας αἰτίαν εἰς τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ δόγματος ἀποβλέπειν ὑπόθεσιν, καὶ διὰ ταύτης δεικνύναι τὴν ἀνάστασιν οὐδαμόθεν ἔχουσαν τὸ πιστόν. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσουσιν, ἐὰν δεῖξαι δυνηθῶσιν ἢ ἀδύνατον ὂν τῷ θεῷ ἢ ἀβούλητον τὰ νεκρωθέντα τῶν σωμάτων ἢ καὶ πάντη διαλυθέντα πάλιν ἑνῶσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων σύστασιν. Ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτο μὴ δύνωνται, παυσάσθωσαν τῆς ἀθέου ταύτης ἀπιστίας καὶ τοῦ βλασφημεῖν ἃ μὴ θέμις· ὅτι γὰρ οὔτε τὸ ἀδύνατον λέγοντες ἀληθεύουσιν οὔτε τὸ ἀβούλητον, ἐκ τῶν ῥηθησομένων γενήσεται φανερόν. Τὸ ἀδύνατόν τινι γινώσκεται κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ γινώσκειν τὸ γενησόμενον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ δύναμιν ἀρκοῦσαν μὴ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καλῶς τὸ ἐγνωσμένον. Ὅ τε γὰρ ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν γενέσθαι δεόντων οὐκ ἂν οὔτ᾿ ἐγειρῆσαι οὔτε ποιῆσαι τὸ παράπαν δυνηθείη ὅπερ ἀγνοεῖ· ὅ τε γινώσκων καλῶς τὸ ποιηθησόμενον, καὶ πόθεν γένοιτ᾿ ἂν καὶ πῶς, δύναμιν δὲ ἢ μηδ᾿ ὅλως ἔχων πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἢ μὴ ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχων, οὐκ ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε τὴν ἀρχήν, εἰ σωφρονοίη καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπισκέψαιτο δύναμιν, ἐγχειρήσας δὲ ἀπερισκέπτως οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτελέσειε τὸ δόξαν. Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε ἀγνοεῖν τὸν θεὸν δυνατὸν τῶν ἀναστησομένων σωμάτων τὴν φύσιν κατά τε μέρος ὅλον καὶ μόριον, οὔτε μὴν ὅποι χωρεῖ τῶν λυομένων ἕκαστον, καὶ ποῖον τῶν στοιχείων μέρος δέδεκται τὸ λυθὲν καὶ χωρῆσαν πρὸς τὸ συγγενές, κἂν πάνυ παρ᾿ ἀνθρώποις ἀδιάκριτον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ τῷ παντὶ πάλιν προσφυῶς ἡνωμένον. Ὧι γὰρ οὐκ ἠγνόητο πρὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἑκάστου συστάσεως οὔτε τῶν γενησομένων στοιχείων ἡ φύσις ἐξ ὧν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα, οὔτε τὰ μέρη τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἤμελλεν λήψεσθαι τὸ δόξαν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου σώματος σύστασιν, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐδὲ μετὰ τὸ διαλυθῆναι τὸ πᾶν ἀγνοηθήσεται ποῦ κεχώρηκεν ἕκαστον ὧν εἴληφε πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου συμπλήρωσιν. Ὅσον μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὴν νῦν κρατοῦσαν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ τὴν ἐφ᾿ ἑτέρων κρίσιν, μεῖζον τὸ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα προγινώσκειν· ὅσον δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν τούτου σοφίαν, ἀμφότερα κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἐπ᾿ ἴσης τῷ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα προγινώσκειν τὸ καὶ διαλυθέντα γινώσκειν.

About this text

Athenagoras argues that God can raise the dead, and that the rising of the body fits God's purpose, human nature, and justice.

Athenagoras (fl. c. 177) was an Athenian philosopher who converted to Christianity and wrote in Greek as a Christian apologist. This treatise is addressed to those who disbelieve or doubt the resurrection of the dead, urging them to examine the question rationally rather than by idle speculation. He wrote to show that bodily resurrection is both possible for God and consistent with God's purpose, human nature, and divine justice.

The work answers pagan philosophers and other critics who claimed that resurrection was impossible or contrary to God's will. Athenagoras first argues that disbelief is unreasonable unless critics can prove resurrection impossible or unwilled by God. He then shows that God's knowledge and power make resurrection possible, and that apparent difficulties such as bodies eaten by animals do not prevent it, because only what is truly proper food can be united to a body.

A reader will meet the critics who raise objections, including the mythological figure Thyestes as an example of cannibalism, and an unnamed apostle quoted as saying that the corruptible must put on incorruptibility. Athenagoras argues from God's purpose in creating humans, from human nature as a compound of soul and body, and from divine justice, which requires that the whole human being receive reward or punishment. The apostle quoted is Paul, and the saying about the corruptible putting on incorruptibility comes from 1 Corinthians 15:54.

New English from the Greek base text; no published English used as wording.

Printed text used

Translated from Athenagorae Philosophi Atheniensis Opera Athenagoras Johann Karl Theodor von Otto Mauke Jena 1857 (Greek)

This work has not yet been re-checked against its source. This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Greek on each section for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.