Falsehood grows beside every truth
Athenagoras opens his treatise by explaining why he will argue first for the truth of resurrection before explaining it, since false opinions must be cleared away before teaching can persuade.
Every doctrine and argument that holds to the truth about what exists has something false growing beside it. But this falsehood does not grow from some underlying principle that moves according to nature, or from the cause proper to each thing as it actually is. It is cultivated by people who honor lawless sowing for the corruption of the truth.
This can be seen first from those who long ago devoted themselves to thinking about these matters and from the disputes they had with their own predecessors and contemporaries, and not least from the very confusion of the arguments being tossed around in public. For such people have left nothing true uncalumniated: not the being of God, not His knowledge, not His activity, not the things that follow these in order and trace out for us the argument of piety.
Some despair of the truth about these matters entirely and once for all. Others twist it to suit their own opinions. Still others make a practice of raising difficulties even about things that are evident.
For this reason I think those who labor over these subjects need two kinds of arguments: some on behalf of the truth, and some about the truth. The arguments on behalf of the truth are for those who disbelieve or doubt. The arguments about the truth are for those who are well-disposed and receive the truth with goodwill.
Because of this, those who wish to examine these matters must look to the need at hand in each case and measure their arguments by it. They must also adjust the order of these arguments to what is fitting, and not, by seeming always to keep the same starting point, neglect what is appropriate and the place that belongs to each argument.
For when it comes to demonstration and natural sequence, the arguments about the truth always stand first, ahead of the arguments on behalf of it. But when it comes to what is more useful, the order is reversed: the arguments on behalf of the truth come before the arguments about it.
A farmer could not properly cast seed into the ground without first removing the wild growth that harms the cultivated seed being sown. A doctor could not put any healthy medicine into a body that needs treatment without first purging the evil already present or checking the evil flowing in. Nor could someone who wishes to teach the truth, when speaking about the truth, persuade anyone if some false opinion is lurking in the minds of the hearers and opposing the arguments.
So we too, looking to what is more useful, sometimes place the arguments on behalf of the truth before the arguments about the truth. And it seems not useless to do the same now in the case of the arguments about the resurrection, as we consider what is fitting.
For in these matters as well we find some who disbelieve entirely, some who doubt, and even among those who have accepted the first principles, some who are just as perplexed as those who doubt. And the most unreasonable thing of all is that they suffer this while having no basis at all from the facts for their disbelief, and while finding no reasonable cause they can state for why they disbelieve or are perplexed.
Greek
Παντὶ δόγματι καὶ λόγῳ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας ἐχομένῳ παραφύεταί τι ψεῦδος· παραφύεται δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης τινὸς ἀρχῆς κατὰ φύσιν ὁρμώμενον ἢ τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον αἰτίας, ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ἔκθεσμον σπορὰν ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς ἀληθείας τετιμηκότων σπουδαζόμενον. Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν πάλαι ταῖς περὶ τούτων φροντίσιν ἐσχολακότων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων πρός τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν πρεσβυτέρους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοχρόνους γενομένης διαφορᾶς, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν ἐν μέσῳ στρεφομένων ταραχῆς. Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι κατέλιπον ἀσυκοφάντητον, οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ τὴν γνῶσιν, οὐ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, οὐ τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς καθ᾿ εἱρμὸν ἑπόμενα καὶ τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν ὑπογράφοντα λόγον. Ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν πάντη καὶ καθάπαξ ἀπογινώσκουσι τὴν περὶ τούτων ἀλήθειαν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς διαστρέφουσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν ἀπορεῖν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν. Ὅθεν οἶμαι δεῖν τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα πονουμένοις λόγων διττῶν, τῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας, τῶν δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας πρὸς τοὺς ἀπιστοῦντας ἢ τοὺς ἀμφιβάλλοντας, τῶν δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πρὸς τοὺς εὐγνωμονοῦντας καὶ μετ᾿ εὐνοίας δεχομένους τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Ὧν ἕνεκεν χρὴ τοὺς περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν ἐθέλοντας τὴν ἑκάστοτε προκειμένην χρείαν σκοπεῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς λόγους μετρεῖν, τήν τε περὶ τούτων τάξιν μεθαρμόζειν πρὸς τὸ δέον, καὶ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖν τὴν αὐτὴν πάντοτε φυλάττειν ἀρχὴν ἀμελεῖν τοῦ προσήκοντος καὶ τῆς ἐπιβαλλούσης ἑκάστῳ χώρας. Ὡς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τὴν φυσικὴν ἀκολουθίαν, πάντοτε πρωτοστατοῦσιν οἱ περὶ αὐτῆς λόγοι τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸ χρειωδέστερον, ἀνεστραμμένως οἱ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς. Οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸς δύναιτ᾿ ἂν προσηκόντως καταβάλλειν τῇ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα, μὴ προεξελὼν τὰ τῆς ἀγρίας ὕλης καὶ τοῖς καταβαλλομένοις ἡμέροις σπέρμασι λυμαινόμενα, οὔτε ἰατρὸς ἐνεῖναί τι τῶν ὑγιεινῶν φαρμάκων τῷ δεομένῳ θεραπείας σώματι, μὴ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν κακίαν προκαθήρας ἢ τὴν ἐπιῤῥέουσαν ἐπισχών· οὔτε μὴν ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐθέλων διδάσκειν, περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγων, πεῖσαι δύναιτ᾿ ἄν τινα ψευδοδοξίας τινὸς ὑποικουρούσης τῇ τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίᾳ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἀντιστατούσης. Διὸ πρὸς τὸ χρειωδέστερον ἀφορῶντες καὶ ἡμεῖς προτάσσομεν ἔσθ᾿ ὅτε τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγους τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ποιῆσαι καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγων οὐκ ἀχρεῖον φαίνεται σκοποῦσι τὸ δέον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις εὑρίσκομεν τοὺς μὲν ἀπιστοῦντας πάντη, τινὰς δὲ ἀμφιβάλλοντας, καὶ τῶν γε τὰς πρώτας ὑποθέσεις δεξαμένων τινὰς ἐπ᾿ ἴσης τοῖς ἀμφιβάλλουσιν ἀποροῦντας· τὸ δὲ πάντων παραλογώτατον ὅτι ταῦτα πάσχουσιν, οὐδ᾿ ἡντιναοῦν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπιστίας ἀφορμήν, οὐδ᾿ αἰτίαν εὑρίσκοντες εἰπεῖν εὔλογον, δι᾿ ἣν ἀπιστοῦσιν ἢ διαποροῦσιν.