On the Resurrection of the Dead · §11 · Athenagoras

The two kinds of argument and the plan for proving resurrection

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Athenagoras has just finished showing that resurrection is possible, willed, and worthy of God; he now pauses to distinguish the argument about truth from the argument on behalf of truth, then announces the three grounds from which he will prove the resurrection.

If each of the points under examination has been demonstrated through what is first by nature and what follows from these, then it is quite clear that the resurrection of dissolved bodies is a work that is possible, willed, and worthy of the one who created them. For through these arguments the falsehood opposed to them has been exposed, along with the unreasonableness of those who disbelieve.

Why should I speak of how each of these points turns back against each of them, and of their connection with one another, if indeed one should even call it a connection, as though they were separated by some otherness, rather than saying that what is possible is also willed, and that what is willed by God is altogether possible, and in keeping with the worth of the one who willed it?

That the argument about the truth is one thing and the argument on behalf of the truth is another has been stated in due measure in what has gone before: how each differs, and when and toward whom each has its usefulness. But perhaps nothing prevents us, for the sake of common safety and of the connection of what has been said with what remains, from making a fresh start from these very points and what belongs to them.

It was fitting for the one to hold first place by nature, and for the other to serve as bodyguard to the first, making a road and clearing away beforehand everything that stands in the way and is steep. For the argument about the truth, being necessary for all human beings for safety and salvation, stands in the front rank by nature, by order, and by need: by nature, because it provides knowledge of the facts; by order, because it exists in these very things and at the same time as the things of which it becomes the revealer; by need, because it becomes the provider of safety and salvation for those who know.

The argument on behalf of the truth is inferior in nature and power, for refuting falsehood is less than strengthening the truth; and it is second in order, for it has its force against those who hold false opinions. And false opinion has grown up from an oversowing and a corruption.

But even though these things are so, the latter is often placed first and sometimes becomes more necessary, since it removes and clears away beforehand the disbelief that troubles some, and the doubt or false opinion among those who are just now approaching. Each of the two is directed toward one end: both the one who refutes falsehood and the one who strengthens the truth have their reference to piety. Yet they are not altogether one and the same. The one is necessary, as I said, for all who believe and who care for the truth and for their own salvation; the other is sometimes more necessary for certain people and toward certain persons. Let these things be said by us in summary form as a reminder of what has already been stated.

We must now proceed to the matter at hand and demonstrate that the argument for the resurrection is true, starting from its cause, the cause according to which and through which the first human being came to be, and those after him, even if they did not come to be in the same manner, and from the common nature of all human beings as human beings, and further from the judgment of the one who made them upon these things, according to how long each one lived and according to the laws by which each conducted his life, a judgment that no one would dispute is just.

Greek

Εἰ δὲ διὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν πρώτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων δέδεικται τῶν ἐξητασμένων ἕκαστον, εὔδηλον ὅτι καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ βουλητὸν καὶ ἄξιον τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἔργον ἡ τῶν διαλυθέντων σωμάτων ἀνάστασις· διὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐδείχθη ψεῦδος τὸ τούτοις ἀντικείμενον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀπιστούντων παράλογον. Τί γὰρ δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῆς ἑκάστου αὐτῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντιστροφῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα συναφείας, εἴ γε δεῖ καὶ συνάφειαν εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἑτερότητί τινι κεχωρισμένων, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν λέγειν βουλητόν, καὶ τὸ τῷ θεῷ βουλητὸν πάντως εἶναι δυνατόν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ βουληθέντος ἀξίαν; Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἕτερος ὁ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος, ἕτερος δὲ ὁ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας, εἴρηται διὰ τῶν προλαβόντων μετρίως, οἷς τε διενήνοχεν ἑκάτερος, καὶ πότε καὶ πρὸς τίνας ἔχει τὸ χρήσιμον· κωλύει δὲ ἴσως οὐδέν, τῆς τε κοινῆς ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰρημένων πρὸς τὰ λειπόμενα συναφείας, ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις προσηκόντων πάλιν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀρχήν. Προσῆκε δὲ τῷ μὲν τὸ πρωτεύειν κατὰ φύσιν, τῶ δὲ τὸ δορυφορεῖν τὸν πρῶτον ὁδοποιεῖν τε καὶ προανείργειν πᾶν ὁπόσον ἐμποδὼν καὶ πρόσαντες. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος, ἀναγκαῖος ὢν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν, πρωτοστατεῖ καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ χρείᾳ· τῇ φύσει μέν, ὡς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν παρεχόμενος, τῇ τάξει δέ, ὡς ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἅμα τούτοις ὑπάρχων ὧν γίνεται μηνυτής, τῇ χρείᾳ δέ, ὡς τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς γινώσκουσι γινόμενος πρόξενος. Ὁ δ᾿ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας φύσει τε καὶ δυνάμει καταδεέστερος, ἔλαττον γὰρ τὸ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐλέγχειν τοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρατύνειν· καὶ τάξει δεύτερος, κατὰ γὰρ τῶν ψευδοδοξούντων ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν· ψευδοδοξία δὲ ἐξ ἐπισπορᾶς ἐπεφύη καὶ παραφθορᾶς. Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων προτάττεται πολλάκις καὶ γίνεταί ποτε χρειωδέστερος, ὡς ἀναιρῶν καὶ προκαθαίρων τὴν ἐνοχλοῦσάν τισιν ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῖς ἄρτι προσιοῦσι τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἢ ψευδοδοξίαν. Καὶ πρὸς ἓν μὲν ἑκάτερος ἀναφέρεται τέλος· εἰς γὰρ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἔχει τὴν ἀναφορὰν ὅ τε τὸ ψεῦδος ἐλέγχων καὶ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρατύνων· οὐ μὴν καὶ καθάπαξ ἕν εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μὲν ἀναγκαῖος, ὡς ἔφην, πᾶσι τοῖς πιστεύουσι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἰδίας σωτηρίας φροντίζουσιν, ὁ δ᾿ ἔστιν ὅτε καί τισι καὶ πρός τινας γίνεται χρειωδέστερος. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς προειρήσθω πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν τῶν ἤδη λεχθέντων. Ἰτέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον, καὶ δεικτέον ἀληθῆ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγον ἀπό τε τῆς αἰτίας αὐτῆς, καθ᾿ ἣν καὶ δι᾿ ἣν ὁ πρῶτος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος οἵ τε μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνον, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον γεγόνασι τρόπον, ἀπό τε τῆς κοινῆς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνθρώπων φύσεως, ἔτι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπὶ τούτοις κρίσεως, καθ᾿ ὅσον ἕκαστος ἔζησε χρόνον καὶ καθ᾿ οὓς ἐπολιτεύσατο νόμους, ἣν οὐκ ἄν τις ἀμφισβητήσειεν εἶναι δικαίαν.

About this text

Athenagoras argues that God can raise the dead, and that the rising of the body fits God's purpose, human nature, and justice.

Athenagoras (fl. c. 177) was an Athenian philosopher who converted to Christianity and wrote in Greek as a Christian apologist. This treatise is addressed to those who disbelieve or doubt the resurrection of the dead, urging them to examine the question rationally rather than by idle speculation. He wrote to show that bodily resurrection is both possible for God and consistent with God's purpose, human nature, and divine justice.

The work answers pagan philosophers and other critics who claimed that resurrection was impossible or contrary to God's will. Athenagoras first argues that disbelief is unreasonable unless critics can prove resurrection impossible or unwilled by God. He then shows that God's knowledge and power make resurrection possible, and that apparent difficulties such as bodies eaten by animals do not prevent it, because only what is truly proper food can be united to a body.

A reader will meet the critics who raise objections, including the mythological figure Thyestes as an example of cannibalism, and an unnamed apostle quoted as saying that the corruptible must put on incorruptibility. Athenagoras argues from God's purpose in creating humans, from human nature as a compound of soul and body, and from divine justice, which requires that the whole human being receive reward or punishment. The apostle quoted is Paul, and the saying about the corruptible putting on incorruptibility comes from 1 Corinthians 15:54.

New English from the Greek base text; no published English used as wording.

Printed text used

Translated from Athenagorae Philosophi Atheniensis Opera Athenagoras Johann Karl Theodor von Otto Mauke Jena 1857 (Greek)

This work has not yet been re-checked against its source. This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Greek on each section for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.