No injustice or unworthiness in resurrection
Athenagoras is arguing that resurrection is not unwilled by God, and now shows that it is neither unjust nor unworthy of God, first with respect to other beings and then with respect to the human being raised.
For what is unwilled is unwilled either because it is unjust to him or because it is unworthy of him. And again, what is unjust is considered either with respect to the one who will be raised himself or with respect to someone else besides him. Now it is clear that none of those outside and numbered among existing things is wronged. For neither would the intelligible natures be wronged by the resurrection of human beings—the resurrection of human beings is no hindrance to their existence, no harm, no outrage—nor indeed would the nature of irrational creatures or of lifeless things be wronged, for they will not exist after the resurrection, and nothing unjust can be done to what does not exist. But even if someone should suppose that they exist forever, they would not be wronged when human bodies have been renewed. For if now, yielding to the nature of human beings and to their needs when they are in want, they are brought under the yoke and into every kind of slavery and are not wronged, much more, when human beings have become incorruptible and free from need and no longer require their service, and they themselves have been released from all slavery, they will not be wronged. For if they had a voice, they would not accuse the Creator of being unjustly diminished in comparison with human beings because they did not obtain the same resurrection as these. For where the nature is not equal, the Just One does not measure out an equal end. And apart from these things, among beings that have no judgment of what is just and no accusation of injustice, there is no wrong.
Nor indeed is it possible to say that some injustice is considered with respect to the human being who is raised himself. For this being is composed of soul and body, and the injustice attaches neither to the soul nor to the body. No one in his right mind will say that the soul is wronged, for in doing so he will inadvertently cast out the present life as well. For if the soul now dwelling in a corruptible and passible body is not wronged, much more will it not be wronged when she lives together with an incorruptible and impassible body. But neither is the body wronged at all. For if now, being corruptible, it is joined to the incorruptible and is not wronged, it is clear that when it is incorruptible and joined to the incorruptible, it will not be wronged. Nor indeed would anyone say that it is an unworthy work of God to raise up and gather together the body that has been dissolved. For if the worse thing is not unworthy—that is, making a corruptible and passible body—much more is the better thing not unworthy, which is incorruptibility and impassibility.
Greek
Τὸ γὰρ ἀβούλητον ἢ ὡς ἄδικον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἀβούλητον ἢ ὡς ἀνάξιον. Καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἄδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖται τὸν ἀναστησόμενον ἢ περὶ ἄλλον τινὰ παρ᾿ αὐτόν. Ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖται τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀριθμουμένων, πρόδηλον. Οὔτε γὰρ αἱ νοηταὶ φύσεις ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναστάσεως ἀδικηθεῖεν ἄν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐμπόδιόν τι ταύταις πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, οὐ βλάβος οὐχ ὕβρις ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάστασις· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ τῶν ἀψύχων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔσται μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν· περὶ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲν ἄδικον. Εἰ δὲ καὶ εἶναί τις ὑποθοῖτο διὰ παντός, οὐκ ἂν ἀδικηθείη ταῦτα, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σωμάτων ἀνανεωθέντων· εἰ γὰρ ὑπείκοντα νῦν τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ταῖς τούτων χρείαις ὄντων ἐνδεῶν, ὑπό τε ζυγὸν ἠγμένα καὶ δουλείαν παντοίαν, οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖται, πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἀφθάρτων καὶ ἀνενδεῶν γενομένων καὶ μηκέτι δεομένων τῆς τούτων χρείας, ἐλευθερωθέντα δὲ πάσης δουλείας οὐκ ἀδικηθήσεται. Οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ φωνῆς μετεῖχεν, ᾐτιάσατο ἂν τὸν δημιουργὸν ὡς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐλαττούμενα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς τούτοις τετύχηκεν ἀναστάσεως. Ὧν γὰρ ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἴση, τούτοις οὐδὲ τὸ τέλος ἴσον ὁ δίκαιος ἐπιμετρεῖ. Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, παρ᾿ οἷς οὐδεμία τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις οὐδὲ μέμψις ἀδικίας.Οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἐκεῖνο φῆσαι δυνατὸν ὡς περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖταί τις ἀδικία τὸν ἀνιστάμενον ἄνθρωπον. Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὗτος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὔτε δὲ εἰς ψυχὴν οὔτε εἰς σῶμα δέχεται τὴν ἀδικίαν. Οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδικεῖσθαι φήσει τις σωφρονῶν, ὅτι λήσεταί γε ταύτῃ συνεκβάλλων καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωήν· εἰ γὰρ νῦν ἐν φθαρτῷ καὶ παθητῷ κατοικοῦσα σώματι μηδὲν ἠδίκηται, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ ἀπαθεῖ συζῶσα οὐκ ἀδικηθήσεται. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα ἀδικεῖταί τι· εἰ γὰρ νῦν φθαρτὸν ἀφθάρτῳ συνὸν οὐκ ἀδικεῖται, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ᾿ ἄφθαρτον ἀφθάρτῳ συνὸν ἀδικηθήσεται. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἐκεῖνο φαίη τις ἂν ὡς ἀνάξιον ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ διαλυθὲν ἀναστῆσαι σῶμα καὶ συναγαγεῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον οὐκ ἀνάξιον, τοῦτ᾿ ἔστι τὸ φθαρτὸν ποιῆσαι σῶμα καὶ παθητόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κρεῖττον οὐκ ἀνάξιον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀπαθές.