Why God made the human being
Athenagoras is beginning the positive argument for resurrection from its cause, asking why God made the human being at all.
The argument from cause runs like this. We must examine whether the human being came into existence simply and to no purpose, or for the sake of something. If for the sake of something, then we must ask whether that something is the very living and continuing in the nature in which he was made, or whether it is for the use of someone else. And if for use, then is it for the use of the maker himself, or of some other being that belongs to him and has been counted worthy of greater care?
When we consider this more broadly, we find that every person of sound mind who is moved by rational judgment to do something does nothing he undertakes on purpose to no end. He acts either for his own use, or for the need of some other being for whom he cares, or for the sake of the thing itself that comes into being, moved by some natural attraction and affection toward its existence. Let me use an illustration to make the point clear. A man builds a house for his own use. He also builds shelter suited to each of the animals he lacks, oxen, camels, and the rest. He does not build these for his own use, as it appears. In their final purpose they are for the animals' sake, but in their immediate purpose they are for the care of the animals he tends. He also begets children, not for his own use and not for the sake of anything else that belongs to him, but so that those born from him may exist and continue as long as possible. By the succession of children and descendants he consoles himself for his own death, and in this way he thinks he makes the mortal immortal.
But these examples come from human beings. God, however, would not have made the human being to no purpose, for he is wise, and no work of wisdom is pointless. Nor would he have made him for his own use, for he lacks nothing at all. To the one who needs nothing whatsoever, none of the things made by him could contribute anything for his own use. Nor did he make the human being for the sake of any of the works made by him. For none of the beings that use reason and judgment, whether greater or lesser, has come into being or comes into being for the use of another, but for the life and continuance of the beings themselves that have come to be.
Reason finds no need that could be the cause of the creation of human beings. The immortal beings lack nothing and have no need of any contribution from human beings for their existence. The irrational animals are by nature ruled, and they fulfill for human beings the uses for which each was made by nature, but they are not by nature meant to make use of human beings in turn. For it was not and is not lawful for what rules and leads to be subjected to the use of what is lesser, or for the rational to be subordinated to the irrational, which are unfit to rule.
Therefore, if the human being did not come into being without cause and to no purpose, for nothing made by God is pointless, at least according to the purpose of the maker, and if he did not come into being for the use of the maker himself or of any other of the works made by God, then it is clear that, according to the first and more general account, God made the human being for his own sake and for the goodness and wisdom seen throughout all creation. According to the account more immediate to the things made, he made him for the life of the beings themselves that came into being, a life not kindled for a short time and then completely extinguished.
For to creeping things, I think, and to winged creatures and swimming creatures, or to speak more generally, to all irrational beings, God assigned such a life. But to those who bear in themselves the image of their maker, who carry with them a mind and share in rational judgment, the maker allotted an everlasting continuance. He did this so that, knowing their maker and his power and wisdom, and following law and justice, they might continue forever without distress together with those things by which they confirmed their previous life, even while they were in corruptible and earthly bodies.
For whatever has come into being for the sake of something else will reasonably cease to exist when those things for whose sake it came into being cease, and it would not continue to no purpose, since nothing pointless has any place among the things made by God. But things that came into being for the very sake of existing and living as their nature requires, since their cause is bound up with their nature and is seen in their very existence, could never admit any cause that completely destroys their existence.
Since this cause is always seen in their existence, the living being that has come into being must certainly be preserved, acting and being acted upon as its nature requires. Each of the two parts from which it was made contributes what belongs to it. The soul exists and continues unchanged in the nature in which it was made, and it works at what it is fitted for. For it is its nature to preside over the impulses of the body and to judge and measure whatever befalls it by the proper criteria and measures. The body moves according to nature toward what it is fitted for, and receives the changes allotted to it. Along with the other changes according to the stages of life or form or size, it receives the resurrection. For the resurrection is a kind of change, and the last of all, and the change of those still living at that time to the better.
Greek
Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας λόγος, ἐὰν ἐπισκοπῶμεν πότερον ἁπλῶς καὶ μάτην γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος ἤ τινος ἕνεκεν· εἰ δέ τινος ἕνεκεν, πότερον ἐπὶ τοῦτο γενόμενον αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν καὶ διαμένειν καθ᾿ ἣν ἐγένετο φύσιν ἢ διὰ χρείαν τινός· εἰ δὲ κατὰ χρείαν, ἤτοι τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν αὐτῷ προσηκόντων καὶ πλείονος φροντίδος ἠξιωμένων. Ὃ δὴ καὶ κοινότερον σκοποῦντες εὑρίσκομεν ὅτι πᾶς εὖ φρονῶν καὶ λογικῇ κρίσει πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τι κινούμενος οὐδὲν ὧν κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἐνεργεῖ ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ᾿ ἤτοι τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκεν χρήσεως ἢ διὰ χρείαν ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν πεφρόντικεν ἢ δι᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ γινόμενον, ὁλκῇ τινι φυσικῇ καὶ στοργῇ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν κινούμενος· οἷον (λεγέσθω γὰρ δι᾿ εἰκόνος τινός, ἵνα σαφὲς γένηται τὸ προκείμενον) ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ μὲν οἶκον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν χρείαν, ποιεῖ δὲ βουσὶ καὶ καμήλοις ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, ὧν ἐστιν ἐνδεής, τὴν ἑκάστῳ τούτων ἁρμόζουσαν σκέπην, οὐκ ἰδίας ἕνεκεν χρήσεως κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ τέλος διὰ τοῦτο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχὲς διὰ τὴν τούτων ὧν πεφρόντικεν ἐπιμέλειαν· ποιεῖται δὲ καὶ παῖδας οὔτε διὰ χρείαν ἰδίαν οὔτε δι᾿ ἕτερόν τι τῶν αὐτῷ προσηκόντων, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναί τε καὶ διαμένειν καθ᾿ ὅσον οἷόν τε τοὺς ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ γεννωμένους, τῇ τῶν παίδων καὶ τῶν ἐγγόνων διαδοχῇ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν παραμυθούμενος καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ θνητὸν ἀπαθανατίζειν οἰόμενος. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων. Ὁ μέντοι θεὸς οὔτ᾿ ἂν μάτην ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἔστι γὰρ σοφός, οὐδὲν δὲ σοφίας ἔργον μάταιον· οὔτε διὰ χρείαν ἰδίαν· παντὸς γάρ ἐστιν ἀπροσδεής. Τῷ δὲ μηδενὸς δεομένῳ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν τῶν ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ γενομένων συντελέσειεν ἂν εἰς χρείαν ἰδίαν. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ διά τινα τῶν ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ γενομένων ἔργων ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγῳ καὶ κρίσει χρωμένων οὔτε τῶν μειζόνων οὔτε τῶν καταδεεστέρων γέγονεν ἢ γίνεται πρὸς ἑτέρου χρείαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωήν τε καὶ διαμονήν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ λόγος εὑρίσκει τινὰ χρείαν τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως αἰτίαν, τῶν μὲν ἀθανάτων ἀνενδεῶν ὄντων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς μηδαμῶς παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων συντελείας πρὸς τὸ εἶναι δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀλόγων ἀρχομένων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον χρείας ἀνθρώποις ἀποπληρούντων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ αὖ τούτοις χρῆσθαι πεφυκότων· θέμις γὰρ οὔτε ἦν οὔτε ἐστὶ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ ἡγεμονοῦν ὑπάγειν εἰς χρῆσιν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν, ἢ τὸ λογικὸν ὑποτάττειν ἀλόγοις, οὖσι πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνεπιτηδείοις. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε ἀναιτίως καὶ μάτην γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος (οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένων μάταιον, κατά γε τὴν τοῦ ποιήσαντος γνώμην), μήτε χρείας ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένων ποιημάτων, εὔδηλον ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον καὶ κοινότερον λόγον δι᾿ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς δημιουργίας θεωρουμένην ἀγαθότητα καὶ σοφίαν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατὰ δὲ τὸν προσεχέστερον τοῖς γενομένοις λόγον διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ζωήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐξαπτομένην, εἶτα παντελῶς σβεννυμένην. Ἑρπετοῖς γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ πτηνοῖς καὶ νηκτοῖς ἢ καὶ κοινότερον εἰπεῖν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀλόγοις τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἀπένειμεν ὁ θεός· τοῖς δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαλματοφοροῦσι τὸν ποιητήν, νοῦν τε συνεπιφερομένοις καὶ λογικῆς κρίσεως μεμοιραμένοις, τὴν εἰς ἀεὶ διαμονὴν ἀπεκλήρωσεν ὁ ποιητής, ἵνα γινώσκοντες τὸν ἑαυτῶν ποιητὴν καὶ τὴν τούτου δύναμίν τε καὶ σοφίαν, νόμῳ τε συνεπόμενοι καὶ δίκῃ, τούτοις συνδιαιωνίζωσιν ἀπόνως οἷς τὴν προλαβοῦσαν ἐκράτυναν ζωήν, καίπερ ἐν φθαρτοῖς καὶ γηΐνοις ὄντες σώμασιν. Ὁπόσα μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου του χάριν γέγονεν, παυσαμένων ἐκείνων ὧν ἕνεκεν γέγονε, παύσεται εἰκότως καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γενόμενα τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν διαμένοι μάτην, ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ θεοῦ γενομένοις τοῦ ματαίου χώραν ἔχοντος· τά γε μὴν δι᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ζῆν καθὼς πέφυκε γενόμενα, ὡς αὐτῆς τῆς αἰτίας τῇ φύσει συνειλημμένης καὶ κατ᾿ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ εἶναι θεωρουμένης, οὐδεμίαν οὐδέποτε δέξαιτ᾿ ἂν τὴν τὸ εἶναι παντελῶς ἀφανίζουσαν αἰτίαν. Ταύτης δὲ ἐν τῷ εἶναι πάντοτε θεωρουμένης, δεῖ σώζεσθαι πάντως καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶον, ἐνεργοῦν τε καὶ πάσχον ἃ πέφυκεν, ἑκατέρου τούτων ἐξ ὧν γέγονε τὰ παρ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ συνεισφέροντος, καὶ τῆς μὲν ψυχῆς οὔσης τε καὶ διαμενούσης ὁμαλῶς ἐν ᾗ γέγονε φύσει, καὶ διαπονούσης ἃ πέφυκεν (πέφυκε δὲ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιστατεῖν ὁρμαῖς καὶ τὸ προσπίπτον ἀεὶ τοῖς προσήκουσι κρίνειν καὶ μετρεῖν κριτηρίοις καὶ μέτροις), τοῦ δὲ σώματος κινουμένου κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, καὶ τὰς ἀποκληρωθείσας αὐτῷ δεχομένου μεταβολάς, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας ἢ κατ᾿ εἶδος ἢ μέγεθος τὴν ἀνάστασιν. Εἶδος γάρ τι μεταβολῆς, καὶ πάντων ὕστατον, ἡ ἀνάστασις ἥ τε τῶν κατ᾿ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον περιόντων ἔτι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον μεταβολή.