On the Trinity · §5 · Didymus the Blind

Will and Generation

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… the force that comes of necessity. And with it comes the notion that the will, and before the will the act of thought, can be conceived as prior to the hypostasis of the Father, a hypostasis that in every respect and at every point has the radiance subsisting together with it.

Besides this, if they believe that all things came into being from the will of the Father through the Son, then the will does not exist beforehand. For it is unworkable and impossible that the Creator should not yet subsist and that afterwards the decision should be taken to create through him.

But this too is full of folly. For if he himself says, “I am, and I have not been changed” (Malachi 3:6), how could the unchangeable nature undergo change with respect to the hypostases, not standing firm in the sameness of the persons but moving and shifting?

And there is this as well. If it is true, as indeed it is true, that “whatever the Father does, the Son also does likewise” (John 5:19), then the Son too will make another son, so that he may do all things just as the Father does. But if he has not made one and does not make one, then he is not a creature, and no fatherly will goes before him.

Let me say something more. If the Saviour says, “This is the will of him who sent me, that everyone who beholds the Son and believes in him should have eternal life” (John 6:40), then it is not the Son who comes from will, but the one who beholds him. For here too the will is found after the Son.

One could thrust away this argument of theirs too, altogether and more quickly, not only by what has been said already but also by what we shall now bring against them. That is, suppose one puts to them in turn a like question: “Does the Father exist because he willed it, or not?” For the very same things they have rehearsed will meet them in return. To “not because he willed it” the answer will be that his subsisting befell him against his purpose, since a necessity of nature turned him, unwilling, to this. To the second, the answer will be that before the willing he was not. For his existence will be traced back to his will, and the will, as their babbling has it, drives him into subsistence as a craftsman makes a thing.

Likewise with another question, which differs from the one before it only in wording: “Is God immortal and good by willing it, or without willing it?” For the same things will be brought against it.

But one will do better to answer them briefly: nothing comes upon the all-perfect God as an addition, nor does anything fall short in him. And just as no will goes before the Father’s existence, his immortality and his goodness, so none goes before the generation either. All such notions are out of tune with right thinking about God.

It is concerning created things that David sings in Psalm 115, “Our God is in heaven; and on the earth he has made all things whatever he willed” (Psalm 115:3), and “You made all things in wisdom” (Psalm 104:24), that is, in the Son, and not in a will. So too in Psalm 73: “You took hold of my right hand; you guided me by your counsel, and you received me with glory” (Psalm 73:23-24). And in Psalm 30: “For wrath is in his anger, and life in his will” (Psalm 30:5), and in the same psalm: “Lord, by your will grant strength to my beauty” (Psalm 30:7). And in Psalm 18: “He will rescue me, because he willed me” (Psalm 18:19).

For in the same way that the Father, being immortal and good, wills to be these things and, willing, is these things, yet does not have his will as their cause (if I may put it so), nor is he these things without willing them, so the will is not the cause of his begetting either.

With us, however, some things we have from the working of God and others from the will that lies in our own power. For it is not by our own will but by God’s that we come to be composed of soul and body and to be rational. How could we, who did not yet exist, will or not will? But by our own choice we are good or bad, and knowledgeable by applying ourselves or ignorant through sloth.

They have come to this head of their argument by taking up, without an accurate understanding, the words “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased” (Matthew 3:17). Had they understood them, they would have had from those very words a firm anchor of the right faith. But as it is, they claim that “in whom I am well pleased” shows the Son to be a creature.

Greek

δέ, ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης βία μετὰ τοῦ προεπινοεῖσθαι τὴν βούλησιν καὶ πρὸ ἐκείνης τὴν νόησιν τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστάσεως τῆς πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως ἐχούσης συνυφεστὸς τὸ ἀπαύγασμα. 9.21 Πρὸς τούτῳ εἰ πιστεύουσι τὰ πάντα ἐκ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ γεγονέναι, οὐ προϋπάρχει ἡ βούλησις. ἀμήχανον γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον μὴ τὸν δημιουργὸν ὑφεστάναι καὶ μετέπειτα δεδόχθαι τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργῆσαι. 9.22 Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀσυνεσίας μεστόν. εἰ γὰρ αὐτός φησιν· «ἐγώ εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἠλλοίωμαι», πῶς ἡ ἀναλλοίωτος φύσις ἀλλοίωσιν ὑποσταίη κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις μὴ ἐν ταυτότητι τῶν προσώπων ἑστῶσα, ἀλλὰ κινουμένη καὶ μεταπίπτουσα; 9.23 Ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο. εἰ ἀληθές, ὥσπερ οὖν ἀληθές, τό «ἅπερ ἂν ὁ πατὴρ ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ», ποιήσει καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἄλλον υἱόν, ἵνα πάντα ὁμοίως τῷ πατρὶ ποιήσῃ. 9.24 εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν κτίσμα οὐδ' ἡγεῖται αὐτοῦ πατρικὴ βούλησις. 9.25 Εἴποιμι καὶ ἕτερον· εἰ λέγει ὁ σωτήρ· «θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ θεωρῶν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον», οὐκ ἐκ θελήματος ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὁ θεωρῶν αὐτόν. 9.26 τὸ γὰρ θέλημα μετὰ τὸν υἱὸν κἀνταῦθα εὑρίσκεται. 9.27 Ἀπεώσαιτο δ' ἂν καθ' ὅλου τις θᾶττον αὐτῶν καὶ τουτονὶ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐκ μόνων τῶν προλεχθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπαχθησομένων πρὸς ἡμῶν· τουτέστιν, εἴγε παραπλήσιον ἀντέρηται αὐτούς· «πότερον ποτὲ ὁ πατὴρ θελήσας ὑπάρχει ἢ οὔ;», τὰ ἴσα γὰρ ὧν ἐμελέτησαν ἀπαντήσει αὐτοῖς· πρὸς μὲν τὸ «οὐ θελήσας», ὅτι παρὰ σκοπὸν αὐτῷ συνέβη τὸ ὑφεστάναι, φύσεως ἀνάγκης εἰς τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἄκοντα περιτρεπούσης· πρὸς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, ὅτι πρὸ τῆς θελήσεως οὐκ ἦν· ἀναχθήσεται γὰρ ἡ ὕπαρξις αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν βούλησιν αὐτοῦ· δημιουργικῶς αὐτόν, κατὰ τὰς βαττολογίας αὐτῶν, εἰς ὑπόστασιν περιελαυνούσης. 9.28 Ὁμοίως καὶ ἄλλο, λέξει μόνον διαφέρον τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· «θελητῶς ὁ θεὸς ἀθάνατός ἐστιν καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἢ ἀνεθελήτως;» ἐπενεχθήσεται γὰρ τὰ αὐτά. 9.29 Κάλλιον δέ τις ποιήσει, εἰ συντόμως ἀποκρίνηται αὐτοῖς, μηδὲν ἐπισυμβαίνειν τῷ παντελείῳ θεῷ μηδέ τι ἀπολιμπάνειν αὐτόν· 9.30 καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ προηγεῖται τῆς πατρικῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ ἀθανασίας καὶ ἀγαθότητος θέλημα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῆς γεννήσεως· καὶ ἀπᾴδειν πάντα ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα τῆς περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνθυμήσεως· 9.31 περὶ δὲ τῶν κτιστῶν τὸν ∆αυῒδ ᾄδειν ἐν ριγʹ ψαλμῷ· 9.31 «ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· καὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ, πάντα ὅσα ἐθέλησεν ἐποίησεν», καί «πάντα ἐν σοφίᾳ ἐποίησας», τουτέστιν ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, οὐχὶ δὲ ἐν θελήματι, 9.32 καὶ ἐν οβʹ ψαλμῷ· «ἐκράτησας τῆς χειρὸς τῆς δεξιᾶς μου, ἐν τῇ βουλῇ 5 σου ὡδήγησάς με καὶ μετὰ δόξης προσελάβου με», καὶ ἐν κθʹ· «ὅτι ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμῷ αὐτοῦ καὶ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ θελήματι αὐτοῦ», καί ἐν· «κύριε, ἐν τῷ θελήματί σου παράσχου τῷ κάλλει μου δύναμιν», καὶ ἐν ιζʹ· «ῥύσεταί με, ὅτι ἠθέλησέν με». 9.33 Καὶ γὰρ ὃν τρόπον, ὑπάρχων ὁ πατὴρ ἀθάνατός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, βούλεται εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ βουλόμενός ἐστιν ταῦτα, οὐκ αἰτίαν, ἵν' οὕτω φράσω, τὴν βούλησιν ἔχων οὔτε μὴν ἀνεθελήτως ὤν· οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ γεννῆσαι ἡ βούλησις αἰτία. 9.34 περὶ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὸ τινὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας, τινὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν θελήματος ἔχειν· 9.35 καὶ γὰρ οὐ βουλήσει μὲν τῇ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ κτώμεθα τὸ συνεστάναι ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ τὸ εἶναι λογικοί· 9.36 οἱ γὰρ οὔποτε ὄντες πῶς εἴχομεν βούλεσθαι ἢ μὴ βούλεσθαι; 9.37 προαιρέσει δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἔχομεν τὸ εἶναι καλοὺς ἢ κακούς, ἐπιστήμονάς τε κατ' ἐπιτηδειότητα ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας κατὰ ῥαθυμίαν. 9.38 Ἐληλύθασιν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦτο οὐκ ἀτρεκεῖ θεωρήματι παραδεχόμενοι τό «οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός, ἐν ᾧ εὐδόκησα», ἐπεὶ ἂν αὐτόθεν εἶχον τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως ἄγκυραν βεβαίαν. 9.39 νυνὶ δὲ φάσκουσιν, ὅτι τό «ἐν ᾧ εὐδόκησα» δείκνυσι κτίσμα τὸν υἱόν.

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