The dilemma of permission and pleasure
Augustine is answering the interlocutors' objection that the acts God permits must be good because they please him.
Against this it was said that these things are indeed unjust now, but not evil. They are unjust because they are done against the laws that forbid them, but they are not evil because, if they were evil, they would never have pleased God. And if they had never pleased him, they would never have happened when he was not allowing it—he who can do all things, and who would not disregard such things when they are so great that they are done against the very religion by which God is worshiped, if they were being done evilly.
At this point I said: If they are not evil for the reason that they are shown to please God by the fact that the Almighty allows them to happen, how will it be good that they are forbidden and overthrown? But if this is not good—that they are overthrown—then the Almighty would not allow it to happen, because this too is done against the religion by which God is worshiped, if the things that please God are overthrown by human beings. But if the Almighty permits this when it is done evilly, then those other things should not be considered good simply because the Almighty permitted them to happen.
Latin
Contra hoc dictum est iniusta quidem esse nunc ista, non tamen mala, et ideo iniusta, quia contra leges, quibus prohibentur, fiunt, ideo autem non mala, quia, si mala essent, numquam deo utique placuissent; porro si numquam placuissent, numquam facta essent illo non sinente, qui omnia potest et qui talia non contemneret, quando tam magna sunt, ut contra ipsam religionem, qua deus colitur, fierent, si male fierent. hic ego, si propterea, inquam, mala non sunt, quia deo placere hinc probantur, quod ea fieri sinit omnipotens, quomodo erit bonum, quod fieri prohibentur et euertuntur? si autem hoc bonum non est, quod euertuntur, quae deo placent, hoc fieri non sineret omnipotens, quia et hoc contra religionem fit, qua colitur deus, si ea, quae deo placent, ab hominibus euertuntur. si autem hoc, cum male fiat, permittit omnipotens, non ideo putanda sunt illa bona, quod ea fieri permisit omnipotens.