The argument from judgment and the end of human life
Athenagoras has just finished arguing that the natural sequence of human life confirms the resurrection, and now turns to the arguments from God's just judgment and the proper end of human life.
All the arguments we set out earlier for examination, which confirm the resurrection, are of one kind, since they spring from the same starting point. Their starting point is the origin of the first human beings in creation. But some of them draw their strength from that very first beginning from which they grew, while others, following along with the nature and life of human beings, receive their credibility from God's providence over us. For the cause according to which and for which human beings came into being is joined together with human nature and has its force from creation, while the argument of justice, according to which God judges human beings who have lived well or badly, has its force from their end. They grow from that first beginning, but they are suspended more from providence.
Since we have demonstrated the first arguments as well as we could, it would be good also to demonstrate the matter at hand through the later arguments. I mean through the honor or punishment owed to each human being according to just judgment, and through the end of human life. But before these very arguments we should place the one that leads according to nature, and first examine the argument about judgment. We should say only this much beforehand, with the care appropriate to the beginning and order of the matters before us: those who have accepted God as the maker of this universe must attribute the guardianship and providence of all that has come into being to his wisdom and justice, if they are willing to remain true to their own first principles. And holding these convictions about these matters, they must consider nothing on earth or in heaven to be without a guardian or without providence, but must recognize that the care from the maker extends through everything unseen and seen alike, small and greater.
For everything that has come into being needs the care of its maker, and each thing needs it in particular according to what it is by nature and for what it is by nature. I think it would be a useless display of ambition to want to go through now or divide up and list what is suitable for each nature. The human being, however, about whom we are now proposing to speak, needs food as a needy creature, succession as a mortal creature, and judgment as a rational creature. If each of these things belongs to a human being by nature, and he needs food for life, succession for the continuance of the race, and judgment for the lawfulness of food and succession, then it is surely necessary that, since food and succession are directed toward the whole person, judgment is also directed toward this same thing. I mean by the whole person the human being made of soul and body, and such a human being becomes accountable for all that has been done and receives honor or punishment for these things.
If just judgment brings punishment for deeds upon the whole person, and neither the soul alone should receive the wages for what was done with the body, for the soul by itself is not affected by the offenses that occur in bodily pleasures, foods, and indulgences, nor the body alone, for the body by itself is unable to discern law and justice, but the human being made of these receives judgment for each of the things he has done, then reason finds that this does not happen in this present life. For what is according to merit does not obtain in the present life, because many godless people who practice every lawlessness and wickedness continue to the end without experiencing evils, and on the contrary those whose lives have been proven in every virtue live in pains, in insults, in slanders, in abuses and all kinds of sufferings. Nor does it happen after death, for the whole person no longer exists, since the soul is separated from the body and the body itself is scattered again into those things from which it was gathered together, no longer preserving anything of its former nature or form, or at any rate even the memory of what was done. So what remains is clear to everyone: according to the apostle, this corruptible thing must put on incorruptibility, so that, when the dead have been made alive by the resurrection and the separated or completely dissolved parts have been united again, each person may justly receive what he did through the body, whether good or bad.
Greek
Τῶν πρώην ἡμῖν εἰς ἐξέτασιν προτεθέντων λόγων καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν πιστουμένων πάντες μέν εἰσιν ὁμογενεῖς, ὡς ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς φύντες ἀρχῆς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἡ τῶν πρώτων ἀνθρώπων ἐκ δημιουργίας γένεσις· ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς κρατύνονται τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἐξ ἧσπερ ἔφυσαν, οἱ δέ, παρεπόμενοι τῇ τε φύσει καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς προνοίας λαμβάνουσι τὴν πίστιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰτία, καθ᾿ ἣν καὶ δι᾿ ἣν γεγόνασιν ἄνθρωποι, συνεζευγμένη τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ δημιουργίας ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁ δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγος, καθ᾿ ὃν κρίνει θεὸς τοὺς εὖ ἢ κακῶς βεβιωκότας ἀνθρώπους, ἐκ τοῦ τούτων τέλους· φύονται μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν, ἤρτηνται δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς προνοίας. Δεδειγμένων δὲ ἡμῖν τῶν πρώτων ὡς οἷόν τε, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων δεῖξαι τὸ προκείμενον, λέγω δὲ διὰ τῆς ὀφειλομένης ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ δικαίαν κρίσιν τιμῆς ἢ δίκης καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον τέλους, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων προτάξαι τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἡγούμενον, καὶ πρῶτόν γε διασκέψασθαι τὸν περὶ τῆς κρίσεως λόγον· τοσοῦτον μόνον ὑπειπόντας, φροντίδι τῆς προσηκούσης τοῖς προκειμένοις ἀρχῆς καὶ τάξεως, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ποιητὴν τὸν θεὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς παραδεξαμένους τῇ τούτου σοφίᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ τὴν τῶν γενομένων ἁπάντων ἀνατιθέναι φυλακήν τε καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἴ γε ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀρχαῖς παραμένειν ἐθέλοιεν, ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τούτων φρονοῦντας μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι μήτε τῶν κατὰ γῆν μήτε τῶν κατ᾿ οὐρανὸν ἀνεπιτρόπευτον μηδ᾿ ἀπρονόητον, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφανὲς ὁμοίως καὶ φαινόμενον, μικρόν τε καὶ μεῖζον, διήκουσαν γινώσκειν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπιμέλειαν. Δεῖται γὰρ πάντα τὰ γενόμενα τῆς παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἐπιμελείας, ἰδίως δὲ ἕκαστον καθ᾿ ὃ πέφυκε καὶ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν· ἀχρείου γὰρ οἶμαι φιλοτιμίας τὸ κατάγειν ἢ διαιρεῖν νῦν ἢ τὸ πρόσφορον ἑκάστῃ φύσει καταλέγειν ἐθέλειν. Ὅ γε μὴν ἄνθρωπος, περὶ οὗ νῦν πρόκειται λέγειν, ὡς μὲν ἐνδεὴς δεῖται τροφῆς, ὡς δὲ θνητὸς διαδοχῆς, ὡς δὲ λογικὸς δίκης. Εἰ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ δεῖται μὲν τροφῆς διὰ τὴν ζωήν, δεῖται δὲ διαδοχῆς διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους διαμονήν, δεῖται δὲ δίκης διὰ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς διαδοχῆς ἔννομον, ἀνάγκη δήπου, τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς διαδοχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ συναμφότερον φερομένης, ἐπὶ τοῦτο φέρεσθαι καὶ τὴν δίκην, λέγω δὲ συναμφότερον τὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον γίνεσθαι πάντων τῶν πεπραγμένων ὑπόδικον, τήν τε ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τιμὴν ἢ τιμωρίαν. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου φέρει τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰργασμένοις δίκην ἡ δικαία κρίσις, καὶ μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν μόνην δεῖ κομίσασθαι τὰ ἐπίχειρα τῶν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰργασμένων (ἀπροσπαθὴς γὰρ αὕτη καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν τῶν περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἢ τροφὰς καὶ θεραπείας γινομένων πλημμελημάτων) μήτε τὸ σῶμα μόνον (ἄκριτον γὰρ τοῦτο καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ νόμου καὶ δίκης), ὁ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἄνθρωπος τὴν ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰργασμένων αὐτῷ δέχεται κρίσιν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε κατὰ τήνδε τὴν ζωὴν εὑρίσκει συμβαῖνον ὁ λόγος (οὐ γὰρ σώζεται τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν ἀθέους καὶ πᾶσαν ἀνομίαν καὶ κακίαν ἐπιτηδεύοντας μέχρι τελευτῆς διατελεῖν κακῶν ἀπειράτους, καὶ τοὐναντίον τοὺς κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐξητασμένον τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον ἐπιδειξαμένους ἐν ὀδύναις ζῆν, ἐν ἐπηρείαις, ἐν συκοφαντίαις, αἰκίαις τε καὶ παντοίαις κακοπαθείαις) οὔτε δὲ μετὰ θάνατον (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔτι τὸ συναμφότερον, χωριζομένης μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, σκεδαννυμένου δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἐξ ὧν συνεφορήθη, καὶ μηδὲν ἔτι σώζοντος τῆς προτέρας φυῆς ἢ μορφῆς, ἤ πού γε τὴν μνήμην τῶν πεπραγμένων), εὔδηλον παντὶ τὸ λειπόμενον, ὅτι δεῖ κατὰ τὸν ἀπόστολον τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο καὶ σκεδαστὸν ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν, ἵνα, ζωοποιηθέντων ἐξ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρωθέντων καὶ πάλιν ἑνωθέντων τῶν κεχωρισμένων ἢ καὶ πάντη διαλελυμένων, ἕκαστος κομίσηται δικαίως ἃ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθὰ εἴτε κακά.