On the Flesh of Christ · §13 · Tertullian

If soul became flesh, the two names and substances collapse

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Tertullian is refuting the view that Christ's flesh was made of soul, arguing from the logic of names and substances that soul and flesh must remain two distinct things in Christ.

Flesh was made soul, they say, so that the soul might be shown. But was flesh then made soul, so that the flesh might be revealed? If flesh is soul, it is no longer soul but flesh. If soul is flesh, it is no longer flesh but soul. Where then is flesh, and where is soul, when each has become the other? No, if they are neither, while each becomes the other, it is certainly most perverse that when we name flesh we should understand soul, and when we mean soul we should interpret it as flesh. Everything will be in danger of being taken otherwise than it is, and of losing what it is while it is taken otherwise, if it is called otherwise than it is. The faithfulness of names is the safety of properties. Even when qualities are changed, they take possession of the words. For example, clay baked out takes the name of potsherd. It does not share in the name of its former kind, because it does not share in the kind itself. So also the soul of Christ, made flesh, cannot not be what it was made, and cannot be what it was, since it was made something else. And since we have brought in this example, let us use it more fully. Certainly a potsherd from clay is one body and one name, of one body. It cannot be called both potsherd and clay, because what it was, it is not, and what it is not, does not cling to it. And the soul does not cling. Therefore the soul made flesh is a uniform solidity and a total singleness and an undivided substance. But in Christ we find soul and flesh set forth with simple and bare words, that is, soul as soul and flesh as flesh, nowhere soul as flesh or flesh as soul, when they should have been so named if they had been so, but each substance is also pronounced separately by him, for the distinction of the two qualities, soul apart and flesh apart. "Why is my soul anxious even to death?" he says (Matthew 26:38), and "The bread that I will give for the salvation of the world is my flesh" (John 6:51). But if the soul had been flesh, there would be one thing in Christ: a fleshly soul or flesh made of soul. But when he divides the kinds, flesh and soul, he shows two. If two, then not one; if not one, then neither a fleshly soul nor flesh made of soul. For soul-flesh or flesh-soul is one thing. Unless he was bearing another soul besides the one that was flesh, and carrying around another flesh besides the one that was soul. But if there is one flesh and one soul, the one anxious even to death and the one bread for the salvation of the world, the number of two substances distinct in their kind is safe, excluding the single species of a fleshly soul.

Latin

Caro facta est anima ut anima ostenderetur. Numquid ergo et caro anima facta est, ut caro manifestaretur? Si caro anima est, iam non anima est, sed caro. Si anima caro est, iam non caro est, sed anima. Ubi ergo caro, et ubi anima est, alterutrum facta est. Immo si neutrum sunt, dum alterutrum alterum flunt, certo perversissimum ut carnem nominantes animam intellegamus, et animam significantes carnem interpretemur. Omnia periclitabuntur aliter accipi quam sunt, et amittere quod sunt, dum aliter accipiuntur, si aliter quam sunt cognominantur. Fides nominum salus est proprietatum. Etiam cum demutantur qualitates, accipiunt vocabulorum possessiones. Verbi gratia argilla excocta testae vocabulum suscipit. Nec communicat cum vocabulo pristini generis, quia nec cum ipso genere. Proinde et anima Christi caro facta non potest non id esse quod facta est, et id non esse quod fuerit, aliud scilicet facta. Et quoniam proximum adhibuimus exemplum, plenius eo utemur. Certe enim testa ex argilla unum est corpus unumque vocabulum unius scilicet corporis. Nec potest testa dici et argilla; quia quod fuit, non est, quod autem non est, et non adhaeret. Et anima non adhaeret. Ergo et anima caro facta uniformis soliditas et singularitas tota est et indiscreta substantia. In Christo vero invenimus animam et carnem simplicibus et nudis vocabulis editas, id est animam animam et carnem carnem, nusquam animam carnem aut carnem animam, quando ita nominari debuissent, si ita fuissent, sed etiam sibi quamque substantiam divise pronuntiatas ab ipso, utique pro duarum qualitatum distinctione, seorsum animam et seorsum carnem. Quid anxia est, inquit, anima mea usque ad mortem? et, Panis, quem ego dedero pro salute mundi, caro mea est. Porro si anima caro fuisset, unum esset in Christo carnea anima aut caro animalis. At cum dividit species, carnem et animam, duo ostendit. Si duo, iam non unum; si non unum, iam nec anima carnalis nec caro animalis. Unum enim est anima caro, aut caro anima. Nisi et seorsum aliam gestabat animam praeter eam quae caro erat, et aliam circumferebat carnem praeter illam quae anima erat. Quodsi una caro et una anima, illa tristis usque ad mortem et illa panis pro mundi salute, salvus est numerus duarum substantiarum in suo genere distantium, excludens carneae animae unicam speciem.

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