All sins, whether of body or will, require repentance
Tertullian is explaining which acts count as sins requiring repentance, arguing that both bodily acts and inward acts of will are equally sins before God.
Now the argument itself calls for me to point out what repentance is just and owed—that is, what things must be assigned to sin—but this may seem unnecessary. For once the Lord is known, the spirit, looked back upon by its own author, rises of its own accord to the knowledge of the truth, and once admitted to the Lord's commands it is immediately taught from those very commands that whatever God keeps a person away from must be assigned to sin. Since it is agreed that God is something of great goodness, surely nothing but evil could displease the good, because there is no friendship between opposites.
Still, it will not be a burden to touch briefly on the fact that some sins are carnal, that is bodily, while others are spiritual. For since a human being is made from the joining of these two substances, he sins from nowhere else than from what he is made of. But they do not differ from each other in this respect, that body and spirit are two things—otherwise they would be all the more equal, because two make one—so let no one distinguish their sins on the basis of the difference of their materials, thinking one lighter or heavier than the other. For both flesh and spirit are God's property: one shaped by his hand, the other completed by his breath. Since they belong to the Lord equally, whichever of them sins offends the Lord equally.
Would you make a distinction between the acts of flesh and spirit, when they share so much communion and partnership in life and in death and in resurrection that they are raised together, then either to life or to judgment—because, of course, they either sinned together or acted innocently together? I have said this first so that we understand that the necessity of repentance presses no less on one part than on both, if either has sinned. The guilt of both is common, and the judge is common—God, that is—and therefore the remedy of repentance is common as well.
From this they are called spiritual and bodily, because every sin is either done or thought: what is in the deed is bodily, because a deed, like a body, can be seen and touched, while what is in the mind is spiritual, because the spirit is neither seen nor grasped. Through this it is shown that not only sins of deed but also sins of will must be avoided and cleansed by repentance. For if human limitation judges only the deed, because it cannot match the hidden places of the will, that does not mean we should ignore the will's crimes under God. God is sufficient for all things. Nothing is removed from his sight from which sin arises at all, because he neither fails to know nor fails to pass judgment on it. He is not a concealer or a betrayer of his own perception.
What of the fact that the will is the origin of the deed? Let them see to it if any sins are attributed to chance or necessity or ignorance; apart from these exceptions, sin is now committed only by the will. Since the will is the origin of the deed, is it not so much more liable to punishment as it is primary in guilt—a guilt that is not released even when some difficulty interrupts the carrying out of the deed? For the will itself is charged against itself, and it cannot be excused by the misfortune of not completing the act, since it did what belonged to it.
Finally, how does the Lord show that he is building an addition onto the law, except by forbidding sins of the will as well? He defines as an adulterer not only the one who has actually fallen into another's marriage, but also the one who has defiled himself by the lust of a look (Matthew 5:28). So what is forbidden to be carried out, the mind dangerously enough represents to itself, and rashly works out the effect through the will. Since the will's force is so great that it satisfies itself and stands in place of the deed, it will be punished in place of the deed.
It is utterly empty to say: "I wanted to, but I did not do it." But you ought to carry it out, because you want it—or else not want it, because you do not carry it out. But you pronounce judgment on yourself by your own conscience's confession. For if you desired something good, you would have been eager to accomplish it; and just as you do not accomplish the evil, so you ought not to have desired it. Wherever you place yourself, you are bound by the charge, because you either wanted evil or did not fulfill good.
Latin
Quorum ergo paenitentia iusta et debita videatur, id est quae delicto deputanda sint, locus quidem expostulat denotare, sed otiosum videri potest. Domino enim cognito ultro spiritus a suo auctore respectus emergit ad notitiam veritatis, et admissus ad dominica praecepta ex ipsis statim eruditur id peccato deputandum a quo deus arceat. Quoniam, cum deum grande quid boni constet esse, utique bono nisi malum non displiceret, quod inter contraria sibi nulla amicitia est. Perstringere tamen non pigebit delictorum quaedam esse carnalia, id est corporalia, quaedam vero spiritalia. Nam cum ex hac duplicis substantiae congregatione confectus homo sit, non aliunde delinquit quam unde constat. Sed non eo inter se differunt, quod corpus et spiritus duo sunt (alioquin eo magis paria sunt, quia duo unum efficiunt), ne quis pro diversitate materiarum peccata eorum discernat, ut alterum altero levius aut gravius existimet. Siquidem et caro et spiritus dei res, alia manu eius expressa, alia afflatu eius consummata. Cum ergo ex pari ad dominum pertineant, quodcunque eorum deliquerit, ex pari dominum offendit. An tu discernas actus carnis et spiritus, quorum et in vita et in morte et in resurrectione tantum communionis atque consortii est, ut pariter tunc aut in vitam aut in iudicium suscitentur, quia scilicet, pariter aut deliquerint aut innocenter egerint? Hoc eo praemiserimus, ut non minorem alteri quam utrique parti, si quid deliquerit, paenitentiae necessitatem intellegamus impendere. Communis reatus amborum est, communis et iudex, deus scilicet, communis igitur et paenitentiae medela. Exinde spiritalia et corporalia nominantur, quod delictum omne aut agitur aut cogitatur, ut corporale sit quod in facto est, quia factum, ut corpus, et videri et contingi habet, spiritale vero quod in animo est, quia spiritus neque videtur neque tenetur. Per quod ostenditur, non facti solum, verum et voluntatis delicta vitanda et paenitentia purganda esse. Neque enim, si mediocritas humana facti solum iudicat, quia voluntatis latebris par non est, idcirco crimina eius etiam sub deo neglegamus. Deus in omnia sufficit. Nihil a conspectu eius remotum unde omnino delinquitur, quia non ignorat nec omittit, quominus in iudicium decernat. Dissimulator et praevaricator perspicaciae suae non est. Quid, quod voluntas facti origo est? Viderint enim, si qua casui aut necessitati aut ignorantiae imputantur, quibus exceptis iam non nisi voluntate delinquitur. Cum ergo facti origo est, non tanto potior ad poenam est, quanto principalis ad culpam, quae ne tunc quidem liberatur, cum aliqua difficultas perpetrationem eius intercipit? Ipsa enim sibi imputatur, nec excusari poterit per illam perficiendi infelicitatem, operata quod suum fuerat. Denique dominus quemadmodum se adiectionem legi superstruere demonstrat, nisi et voluntatis interdicendo delicta, cum adulterum non eum solum definit qui cominus in alienum matrimonium cecidisset, verum etiam illum qui aspectus concupiscentia contaminasset? Adeo quod prohibetur administrare, satis periculose animus sibi repraesentat, et temere per voluntatem expungit effectum. Cuius voluntatis cum vis tanta sit, ut non solatium sui saturans pro facto cedat, pro facto ergo plectetur. Vanissimum est dicere: Volui, nec tamen feci. Atquin perficere debes, quia vis, aut nec velle, quia nec perficis. Sed ipse conscientiae tuae confessione pronuntias. Nam si bonum concupisceres, perficere gestisses: porro sicut malum non perficis, nec concupiscere debueras. Quaqua te constitueris, crimine adstringeris, quia aut malum volueris, aut bonum non adimpleveris.