Perishable flesh and the gods of myth
It was not, then, as a trained reasoner that Celsus spoke when he compared the human flesh of Jesus with gold and silver and stone and said, “It is more perishable than these.” For in strict reasoning, neither is one imperishable thing more imperishable than another imperishable thing, nor one perishable thing more perishable than another perishable thing. But even granting that it is more perishable, we shall still say this in reply: if the matter that underlies all qualities can exchange its qualities, how can it not be possible for the flesh of Jesus also to exchange its qualities and become such as it had to be in order to dwell in the ether and the regions above it, no longer having the properties of fleshly weakness, nor the things that Celsus called “more foul”?
Nor in this does he act as a philosopher. For what is properly foul is such because of wickedness, and the nature of a body is not foul; for it is not insofar as it is the nature of a body that it has wickedness, which is what gives rise to foulness.
Then, since he foresees the defence we make about the change of his body, he says: “But once he has put these off, then, it seems, he will be a god. Why then not rather Asclepius, Dionysus, and Heracles?” We shall reply: What great deed did Asclepius or Dionysus or Heracles accomplish? And whom will they be able to show as improved in character and made better by their words and their life, so that they should become gods? Let us read the many stories about them and see whether they kept themselves clean of licentiousness, or injustice, or folly, or cowardice. If nothing of the kind were found in them, Celsus's argument in putting those just named on a level with Jesus would be strong. But if it is clear, even though some better things are reported of them, that they are recorded to have done countless things contrary to right reason, how can you still say with good reason that they, rather than Jesus, became gods when they put off the mortal body?
Greek
Οὐχ ὡς διαλεκτικὸς μὲν οὖν εἶπεν ὁ Κέλσος, παραβάλλων τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας τοῦ Ἰησοῦ σάρκας χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ λίθῳ, ὅτι αὗται ἐκείνων φθαρτότεραι. πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον οὔτ᾿ ἄφθαρτον ἀφθάρτου ἀφθαρτότερον οὔτε φθαρτὸν φθαρτοῦ φθαρτότερον. ἀλλ᾿ εἰ ἄρα φθαρτότερον, ὅμως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο φήσομεν ὅτι, εἴπερ δυνατὸν ἀμείβειν ποιότητας τὴν ὑποκειμένην πάσαις ποιότησιν ὕλην, πῶς οὐ δυνατὸν καὶ τὴν σάρκα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἀμείψασαν ποιότητας γεγονέναι τοιαύτην, ὁποίαν ἐχρῆν εἶναι τὴν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ τοῖς ἀνωτέρω αὐτοῦ τόποις πολιτευομένην, οὐκέτι ἔχουσαν τὰ τῆς σαρκικῆς ἀσθενείας ἴδια καὶ ἅτινα μιαρώτερα ὠνόμασεν ὁ Κέλσος; οὐδὲ τοῦτο φιλοσόφως ποιῶν· τὸ γὰρ κυρίως μιαρὸν ἀπὸ κακίας τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· φύσις δὲ σώματος οὐ μιαρά· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ φύσις σώματός ἐστι, τὸ γεννητικὸν τῆς μιαρότητος ἔχει τὴν κακίαν. εἶτ᾿ ἐπεὶ ὑπιδόμενος τὴν παρ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀπολογίαν λέγει περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ ὅτι ἀλλ᾿ ἀποθέμενος ταύτας ἄρα ἔσται θεός· τί οὖν οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς καὶ Διόνυσος καὶ Ἡρακλῆς; φήσομεν· τί τηλικοῦτον Ἀσκληπιὸς ἢ Διόνυσος ἢ Ἡρακλῆς εἰργάσαντο; καὶ τίνας ἕξουσιν ἀποδεῖξαι βελτιωθέντας τὰ ἤθη καὶ κρείττους γενομένους ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων καὶ τοῦ βίου αὐτῶν, ἵνα γένωνται θεοί; πολλὰς γὰρ τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορίας ἀναγνόντες, ἴδωμεν εἰ ἐκαθάρευσαν ἀπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ ἀδικίας ἢ ἀφροσύνης ἢ δειλίας. καὶ εἰ μὲν μηδὲν εὑρεθείη τοιοῦτον ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἰσχυρὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοῦ Κέλσου λόγος, ἐξισῶν τῷ Ἰησοῦ τοὺς προειρημένους· εἰ δὲ δῆλόν ἐστι, κἄν τινα φέρηται περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς χρηστότερα, ὅτι μυρία ὅσα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πεποιηκέναι ἀναγεγραμμένοι εἰσὶ. πῶς ἔτι εὐλόγως μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἰησοῦ φήσεις αὐτοὺς ἀποθεμένους τὸ θνητὸν σῶμα γεγονέναι θεούς;