Theological Theses · §1796 · Louis Le Blanc de Beaulieu

Le Blanc: no act is free unless it depends in some way on the will, which could have omitted it

For my part, I think no act of any faculty in man, not even of the mind itself, is free unless it depends in some way on the will and happens either at its command or with some kind of its consent. To put it more plainly: unless it is an act the man could have left undone if he had wished.

Who would call an act freely done by a man if he could not have made it otherwise however much he wanted to, and if his will is not supposed to have taken part in it in any way, directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately?

Again, since every free action can fall under a command and take on the character of virtue or vice, it must come in some way from the will. That is why the schools have so far agreed in accepting Augustine's maxim that sin is not sin unless it is voluntary, that is, unless the sinner's will is in some way its source and cause, which is how the common understanding of the faithful takes that saying.

Latin

XLIV. Quantum ad me attinet, existimo nullum actum ullius facultatis, etiam mentis ipsius in homine, liberum esse, nisi qui a voluntate quodammodo pendeat, & ea vel imperante, vel aliquomodo consentiente fiat; adeoque ut clarius dicam, quem homo non potuisset omittere, si voluisset. Quis enim ab homine libere actum dicat, quod ab homine, etsi maxime voluerit, non potuit aliter fieri; & ad quod nullomodo directe, vel indirecte, mediate, vel immediate, supponitur illius concurrisse voluntas? Ac cum omnis actio libera sub praeceptum cadere possit, & virtutis, vel vitii rationem induere, necesse est ut a voluntate quodammodo procedat. Hactenus enim in Scholis communi consensu recepta est Augustini sententia, peccatum non habere rationem peccati, si non sit voluntarium, id est, si voluntas ejus aliqua ratione principium & causa non sit, prout communis fidelium sensus dictum illud interpretatur.

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