That does not make freedom formal in the will alone, since every free act also springs from deliberation
It does not follow, though, that freedom should be said to be formally in the will alone. Every free action owes its origin in some way to the will, but every free action also arises from some weighing and deliberation by the mind.
The intellect produces no action freely that the will could not have prevented, and in the same way no act of the will is free unless the mind was able to weigh and deliberate about it. With equal right, then, free actions must be traced to both mind and will. If one concludes from the first point that freedom is formally in the will, one can conclude from the second that it is formally in the intellect.
Latin
XLV. Neque tamen inde consequens est, ut libertas dicatur esse formaliter in sola voluntate. Etenim quemadmodum omnis actio libera ortum suum voluntati aliquomodo debet, sic quoque omnis actio libera nascitur ex aliqua mentis consultatione, & deliberatione. Et sicut intellectus nullam actionem libere elicit quam non potuerit impedire voluntas, ita quoque nullus actus voluntatis liber est, de quo non licuerit menti consultare, atque deliberare. Unde sequitur aequo jure, ad mentem atque voluntatem referendas esse actiones liberas, ac proinde, si inde colligitur libertatem formaliter esse in voluntate, inde quoque colligi posse, illam formaliter esse in intellectu.