Alexander More: free choice is intellect and will together, whether 'appetitive mind' or 'intellective appetite'
Alexander More, the famous man already mentioned, holds with those learned men that intellect and will in a sense divide free choice between them. Free choice, he thinks, is nothing but intellect and will in so far as the two faculties work together and are held together by a kind of bond or marriage. Which of the two faculties it rests in more, he leaves open.
"For as the choice of the intellect ends in the will," he says, "so the freedom of the will has its root in the intellect." On his view, then, free choice can be called the intellect as it moves and affects the will, or the will as the intellect moves it. In Aristotle's own words, it is "either desiring mind or thinking desire" (On Grace and Free Choice, disputation 1, thesis 21).
Latin
XLIII. Celeberrimus autem jam dictus Alexander Morus, cum Viris illis Doctis, censet intellectum atque voluntatem liberum arbitrium inter se veluti partiri: & liberum arbitrium non esse aliud quam intellectum atque voluntatem, quatenus hae duae facultates concurrunt, & quodam quasi vinculo, sive conjugio inter se continentur. In utra vero potius facultate consistat, in medio relinquit. Sicut enim, inquit, arbitrium intellectus terminatur in voluntate, ita libertas voluntatis radicem habet in intellectu. Adeo ut, ex ejus mente, liberum arbitrium dici possit intellectus quatenus voluntatem movet atque afficit: vel voluntas quatenus ab intellectu movetur. Sive ipsius Aristotelis verbis ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς, ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική. De Gratia & libero arbitrio disp. 1. thes. 21.