De la Place: the same freedom belongs to intellect and will, but more to the will, which commands
Josué de la Place, another very learned man and Amyraut's colleague while he lived, agrees with him that freedom is not formally in the will alone, and that the intellect as well as the will is a free faculty.
He differs from his colleague in this: Amyraut distinguishes the freedom that belongs to the intellect from the freedom that belongs to the will and gives each its own definition, whereas de la Place holds that the very freedom by which the will is called free also belongs to the intellect. On his view that freedom lies in exemption from three necessities: compulsion, being settled by matter, and being settled by sense. And that exemption, he judges, belongs to the intellect just as much.
His view is also opposed to Amyraut's in this: when will and intellect are compared, he thinks freedom lies more with the will. The reason is that he thinks command and mastery in man rest with the will rather than the intellect. The intellect does not move the will by its act as by a command, but by the object it sets before it; the will, by contrast, moves the mind and applies it to understanding by its act, as by a command.
Even so, that learned man thinks that some acts of our mind are free, and so morally good or evil, though they are not done at the will's command and do not depend on its consent as on their source. He counts faith, and the heresy opposed to it, among such acts. See his Posthumous Works, treatise On Free Choice, pp. 163-164.
Latin
XLII. Porro Josue Placeus vir quoque Doctissimus, Amyraldi dum viveret Collega, istud habet cum eo commune, quod existimat libertatem non esse formaliter in sola voluntate; nec solam voluntatem sed etiam intellectum esse facultatem liberam; verum in eo differt a Collega, quod alter ille distinguit inter libertatem quae competit intellectui, & libertatem quae competit voluntati, & utrique suam peculiarem definitionem assignat; hic vero vult illam eandem libertatem, a qua voluntas libera nominatur, intellectui quoque convenire: Etenim libertas illa, ex ejus mente, sita est in immunitate a triplici necessitate, coactionis nempe, determinationis a materia, & determinationis a sensu. Quae immunitas ut ipse arbitratur, ad intellectum ex aequo pertinet. Ac praeterea in eo sententia illius priori opposita est, quod si voluntas & intellectus inter se conferantur, libertas penes voluntatem ipsi magis esse videtur. Idque quia censet imperium & dominium in homine esse potius penes voluntatem, quam penes intellectum: propterea quod intellectus voluntatem non movet per suum actum veluti per imperium, sed per objectum quod ipsi proponit; voluntas autem mentem movet, & applicat ad intelligendum per suum actum, tanquam per imperium. Quicquid sit tamen putat ille Vir Doctus quosdam mentis nostrae actus liberos esse, adeoque bonos, aut malos moraliter, qui tamen ex voluntatis imperio non fiunt, nec ab ejus consensu, ut a sui quodam principio pendent, cujusmodi actus censet esse fidem & haeresin illi oppositam. Ut videre est in ejus Opusculis Posthumis tract. de lib. Arbitr. pag. 163. & 164.