Some also exclude the motive or impulsive necessity that God might impose
Beyond the necessity that comes from compulsion, from matter, from sense or from any other settling by nature, there is a necessity thought to come from an outside cause, God himself for instance, moving and driving the faculty in such a way that he lays on it a true necessity of acting. That is, he removes from the agent the power to act otherwise, even though the agent is supposed to act of his own accord and not unwillingly. The schools call this motive or impulsive necessity.
Some among the Reformed think that this necessity too clashes with human freedom. They hold that freedom cannot coexist with any necessity in the proper sense, what the schools call necessity of the consequent, as opposed to necessity of the consequence.
Latin
XVI. Sed praeter necessitatem quae est a coactione, a materia, vel a sensu, aut a quavis alia naturae determinatione, quaedam necessitas est quae concipitur oriri ab aliqua causa externa, velut ab ipso Deo, sic facultatem ipsam movente atque impellente, ut veram imponat agendi necessitatem, id est, ab agente tollat potestatem aliter agendi; licet qui agit supponatur agere sponte, & non invitus. Quam necessitatem Scholae motivam atque impulsivam vocant. Non desunt autem inter Reformatos, qui hanc quoque necessitatem cum humana libertate pugnare existiment, quique putent cum ea consistere non posse ullam proprie dictam necessitatem, quae in Scholis appellatur necessitas consequentis, opposite ad necessitatem quae consequentiae dicitur.