Amyraut: neither movement belongs to free choice, which needs prior deliberation (prohairesis)
Then he shows that neither movement belongs to free choice. Not the first, because free choice is what Aristotle called prohairesis, and as he says, "every prohairesis is preceded by some probouleusis. No one deliberates about that final end; one is carried toward it not only by necessity but without any prior deliberation (aprobouleutos)."
Not the second either: though it differs from the first, it is just as much without prior deliberation. It is so sudden and so quick, whether it comes from some disturbance or bursts out at the sight of something great, unforeseen and unexpected, that it gets ahead of all weighing. He infers that such a movement is indeed hekousion, spontaneous and voluntary, but not prohairetikon, free and elective.
This is why it is rightly said that the first stirrings of our passions are not in our power. Only the things we take counsel about, whether we should take them up or leave them alone, are in our power, and we do not count as in our power what runs ahead of all deliberation.
So at last he concludes (p. 65): "What belongs to our choice, then, must be the things we can deliberate about. And we should say that those things come from our free choice which we have deliberated about in such a way that desire followed the deliberation and weighing. That, as we have often said, is where prohairesis lies."
Latin
XV. Postea vero neutram istarum motionum ad liberum arbitrium pertinere ostendit. Non priorem, quia liberum arbitrium est id quod Aristoteles προαίρεσιν appellavit. Jam vero, inquit, προαίρεσιν omnem antecedit aliqua προβούλευσις. Nemo autem de extremo illo fine consultat, sed fertur in eum non necessario duntaxat, sed etiam ἀπροβουλεύτως. Non etiam superiorem, quia etsi motus iste a superiori differat, est etiam cum eo aeque ἀπροβούλευτος. Siquidem usque adeo subitus est, usque adeo velociter, vel ex perturbatione aliqua ortus, vel ex ingentis alicujus & improvisi atque inopinati objecti praesentia natus erumpit, ut omnem consultationem antevertat. Unde colligit motum ejusmodi esse quidem ἑκούσιον, id est, spontaneum & voluntarium, non autem προαιρετικόν, id est, liberum atque electivum. Ac propterea recte dici solere primos passionum nostrarum impetus non esse in nostra potestate; quoniam ea sola sunt in nostra potestate de quibus consilium capimus, an sint a nobis, vel usurpanda, vel omittenda: ac proinde quae omnem deliberationem praecurrunt, illa in potestate nostra esse non arbitramur. Unde tandem concludit pag. 65. Restat ergo ut ad arbitrium nostrum pertinere putentur ea de quibus deliberare possumus, utque illa itidem ex arbitrio nostro libero profecta esse dicamus de quibus ita deliberavimus, ut deliberationem & consultationem secuta sit appetitio: qua in re τὴν προαίρεσιν, jam saepe sitam esse diximus.