To Florus 5.60
But why turn to infants, when the Manichaeans’ question does not allow even an adult to sin by will? If evil arose in a human being because he was made from nothing, and he necessarily received his making from nothing, he undoubtedly received evil from necessity, not possibility. Although lengthy argument has destroyed this, let us discuss the same point a little longer, so that repetition makes it increasingly clear. You ask where the evil will itself existed in the first man. I answer: from a movement of the mind under no compulsion. You ask where that movement itself came from. I answer: what are you asking? Where it could come from, or from what it was compelled to exist? If you say, as you also wrote, ‘From what it was compelled to exist,’ I reply that your words are inconsistent and contradictory. You ask who compelled something that cannot exist except under no compulsion. This dissolves through its own contradiction; a question without order has no force.
You therefore ask with great foolishness where the evil will itself comes from. By ‘where,’ you ask not its occasion but its origin, that is, its nature. Yet, as discussed above, if it receives a nature, it loses its own definition, which says ‘under no compulsion’; if it retains its definition, it excludes predetermination by birth. The human being therefore sinned not because he was made from nothing, not because he was made by God, not because he was made from darkness, and not because he was made with free will. He sinned because he willed: that is, he had an evil will because he willed.
Latin
Sed quid nos ad parvulos; cum quaestio Manichaeorum nec perfectae aetatis hominem dicat voluntate peccare? Nam si ideo exortum est in homine malum, quia de nihilo factus erat, a necessario autem habuit homo ut de nihilo fieret; sine dubio malum non a possibili, sed a necessario recepit. Quod quia longa disputatione destructum est, adhuc modicum, quo magis ac magis iteratione lucescat, super hoc eodem disseramus. Quaeris ergo unde ipsa voluntas mala in primo homine exstiterit. Respondeo: De motu animi, cogente nullo. Quaeris et unde ipse motus. Respondeo: Quid requiris? Unde esse potuerit, an unde esse compulsus sit? Si dicas, quod scripsisti quoque: Unde esse compulsus est, referam te asystata et contraria loqui. Quaeris enim quis coegerit, quod esse non possit, nisi cogente nullo; quod quia ipsa sui contrarietate dissolvitur, nihil habet virium quaestio, quae ordinem non habet. Igitur stolidissime interrogas, unde ipsa voluntas mala. Hoc enim quod dicis: Unde, non occasionem, sed originem eius, id est, naturam requiris; at id, sicut supra tractatum est, si naturam accipit, definitionem sui perdit, qua dictum est: cogente nullo; si vero definitionem tenet, praeiudicium nativitatis excludit. Non ideo ergo peccavit homo, quia de nihilo factus est, non ideo quia a Deo factus est, non ideo quia de tenebris factus est, non ideo quia liberi arbitrii factus est; sed ideo peccavit, quia voluit; id est, ideo habuit voluntatem malam, quia voluit.
About this text
Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.
Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.
Witnesses
- Copy-text Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Julian (Latin · Julian’s words as quoted, Books 1–6)
- Checked print Augustinus.it Latin of the Unfinished Work (Latin · Same work)
- Checked print Migne PL 45 (Latin · Hard cases)
This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.