To Florus 5.61
Will, then, which is nothing other than a movement of the mind under no compulsion, owes its possibility to nature and its result to itself. It arose within nature, but from possibility, not necessity. If someone says here, ‘But a nature capable of an evil will is evil,’ I answer, ‘But a nature capable of a good will is good.’ It would therefore be called excellent and utterly evil at the same time. Yet the nature of things does not permit one and the same thing at one and the same time to be filled with opposing moral qualities. If it is thought evil because it could do evil, let it be believed good because it could do good. ‘Why,’ he asks, ‘could the nature that did good also do evil?’ I answer: because this good called virtue could not belong to the person as his own unless it were voluntary. It would not be voluntary if it carried the necessity of good; it would have suffered the necessity of good if it had not possessed the possibility of evil. Therefore, to preserve the right of good, the possibility of evil was admitted.
Latin
Voluntas ergo, quae nihil est aliud quam motus animi cogente nullo, possibilitatem suam naturae debet, effectum suum sibi. In natura enim exorta est, sed a possibili, non a necessario. Hic si dicat aliquis: Sed mala natura, quae potuit habere voluntatem malam; respondeo: Sed bona natura, quae potuit habere voluntatem bonam. Uno ergo tempore optima simul pessimaque dicetur. At id rerum ratio non sinit, ut uno eodemque tempore una eademque res contrariis meritorum qualitatibus impleatur. Si igitur ideo mala putetur, quia potuit malum facere; ideo bona credatur, quia potuit bonum operari. Cur autem, inquit, et malum potuit, quae bonum operabatur? Respondeo: Quia bonum hoc, quod virtus dicitur, proprium esse non poterat, nisi fuisset voluntarium; voluntarium autem non esset, si necessitatem boni habuisset; necessitatem autem boni pertulisset, si non habuisset possibilitatem mali. Ut ergo constaret ius boni, admissa est possibilitas mali.
About this text
Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.
Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.
Witnesses
- Copy-text Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Julian (Latin · Julian’s words as quoted, Books 1–6)
- Checked print Augustinus.it Latin of the Unfinished Work (Latin · Same work)
- Checked print Migne PL 45 (Latin · Hard cases)
This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.