The Capacity for Virtue and Vice

It signifies an opponent in the Greek sense, or the object of opposition; and the opponent, when taken in relation to a human, is equal to the enemy, harmful. Just as the enemy is such by volition, so too is the opponent; just as the names of these two are opposites: for friend, well-wishing, concordant, and of one mind, are names signifying volition. For the same person is called friend and well-wisher, just as the enemy is called devil, Satan, and evil.

As the Savior teaches in the Gospel to say this to others in the prayer to the disciples: 'And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one' (Matt 6:13). For even the name of the evil one is indicative of volition. If, therefore, through all those whom it signifies, the original evil one and the first apostate from virtue is such by volition, he cannot be evil by essence; but if they were to say this, that he might have been evil by essence and also those things which are volitional, by which they are so named, let them know that in essential things volition is not taken up. For no one says that an animal or a stone is volitional; for these are essential. Therefore, nothing is volitional in them, for in those things volition exists where volition is.

But perhaps they will say: 'Why did the good God lead him to be such a harmful or miserable being in his becoming?' Let them know this, saying that this view does not apply to us alone, but also to all those to whom providence opposes. For many others, placing trust in providence, say that all rational animals, in whom evil also grows, are from God. If they say these things concerning the devil, they are compelled to say this concerning all rational beings. However, we do not imitate them; we say: The one who made the being capable of falling into evil by his own inclination is not the cause of evil. For he fashioned a rational animal which he willed to be good from its own volition.

..., having the power of self-agency to turn toward either side. For he wished himself to be good, choosing the good voluntarily. For no one born can be good by necessity; but all who are good are such voluntarily. Therefore, it was necessary that the one making his choice his own good should have the same power as the capacity for taking up the good.

And it was said that the receptive is receptive of both good and evil; thus, to the rational being so constructed, having power toward virtue and vice, a command is given so that he may have virtue by actuality, and vice only by disposition. For the law of the Creator encourages, and anoints, and cooperates toward virtue, repelling the nature of evil. And even if a power of evil exists within the rational being, this is not bad because of the power. For I say both the powers and the choices are of virtue and of vice. We choose to have the power of virtue so that we may be able to take it up by actuality; we also choose to have the power of vice. For we possess it when we have virtue in actuality. And this glory is not ours alone, but also of all who have philosophized correctly concerning rational animals.

And even if God made the essence called the devil, He did not create it as a devil, but as receptive of virtue, so that it might have it; and receptive of vice, so that it might avoid it. Since virtue is unjoined to vice, and virtue is a friend to God, having placed both powers in the rational being, He brought them about for this reason, so that we might take up the one into actuality, and avoid the other power from the end, which is actuality. So everything rational has become capable of being serious, and not trivial. If any of the rational beings has run contrary to the one who made and provides, the cause is not of the maker and lawgiver, but of the...