On the Resurrection of the Dead · §22 · Athenagoras

Virtues and vices cannot belong to the soul alone

Click or tap any sentence to jump there. The side buttons skip a paragraph.

Athenagoras is arguing that if virtues and vices cannot even be conceived apart from the body, then honor and punishment for them cannot fall on the soul alone.

In addition to what has already been said, is it not absurd to hold that virtue and vice cannot even be conceived in the soul alone—since we recognize that the virtues are virtues of a human being, just as the vice opposed to them is not that of a soul separated from the body and existing by itself—yet the honor or punishment for these is borne upon the soul alone?

How could anyone even conceive of courage or endurance in a soul by itself? It has no fear of death, wound, mutilation, loss, or outrage, nor of the pains that come from these or the suffering they cause.

How could self-control and temperance exist in it, when no desire draws it toward food or sexual union or the other pleasures and delights, and nothing else troubles it from within or provokes it from without?

How could prudence exist in it, when there are no things to be done or not done, no things to be chosen or avoided, laid before it—indeed, when it has no movement at all or natural impulse toward any of the things to be done?

And where at all is justice between souls natural to them, or justice toward anything else of the same kind or of a different kind, when they have no source, no means, and no manner by which to assign what is equal according to worth or proportion—the honor toward God being excepted—and when they have no impulse or movement either to use what is their own or to abstain from what belongs to others?

For the use of natural things, or abstinence from them, belongs to beings made by nature to use them; but the soul needs nothing and is not naturally suited to use anything or anyone, and for this reason the so-called proper activity of the parts cannot be found in a soul that is in such a condition.

Greek

Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν μηδὲ νοηθῆναι δύνασθαι χωρὶς ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς (ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἶναι γινώσκομεν τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡσπεροῦν καὶ τὴν ταύταις ἀντικειμένην κακίαν οὐ ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης τοῦ σώματος καὶ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν οὔσης), τὴν δ᾿ ἐπὶ τούτοις τιμὴν ἢ τιμωρίαν ἐπὶ μόνης φέρεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς; Ἢ πῶς ἄν τις καὶ νοήσειεν ἐπὶ ψυχῆς μόνης ἀνδρείαν ἢ καρτερίαν, οὐκ ἐχούσης οὐ θανάτου φόβον, οὐ τραύματος οὐ πηρώσεως οὐ ζημίας οὐκ αἰκίας, οὐ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀλγημάτων ἢ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κακοπαθείας; Πῶς δὲ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδεμιᾶς ἑλκούσης αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίας πρὸς τροφὴν ἢ μῖξιν ἢ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονάς τε καὶ τέρψεις, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλου τινὸς οὔτ᾿ ἔσωθεν ἐνοχλοῦντος οὔτ᾿ ἔξωθεν ἐρεθίζοντος; Πῶς δὲ φρόνησιν, οὐχ ὑποκειμένων αὐτῇ πρακτέων καὶ μὴ πρακτέων, οὔθ᾿ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδεμιᾶς ἐνούσης αὐτῇ κινήσεως τὸ παράπαν ἢ φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς ἐπί τι τῶν πρακτέων; Ποῦ δὲ ὅλως ψυχαῖς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλας δικαιοσύνη προσφυὴς ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἢ ἑτερογενῶν, οὐκ ἐχούσαις οὔτε πόθεν οὔτε δι᾿ ὧν οὔτε πῶς ἀπονείμωσι τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν ἢ κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, ἐξῃρημένης τῆς εἰς θεὸν τιμῆς, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλως ἐχούσαις ὁρμὴν ἢ κίνησιν πρὸς χρῆσιν ἰδίων ἢ πρὸς ἀποχὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, τῆς μὲν χρήσεως τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἢ τῆς ἀποχῆς ἐπὶ τῶν χρῆσθαι πεφυκότων θεωρουμένης, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς μήτε δεομένης τινὸς μήτε χρῆσθαί τισιν ἤ τινι πεφυκυίας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τῆς λεγομένης ἰδιοπραγίας τῶν μερῶν ἐπὶ τῆς οὕτως ἐχούσης ψυχῆς εὑρεθῆναι δυναμένης;