Tertullian — Against Marcion 2.7
By this definition everything remains safe for God: the nature of goodness, the reason of arrangement, and the fullness of foresight and power. Yet you ought also to demand of God the highest seriousness and outstanding faithfulness in every institution of his, so that you stop asking whether something could happen against God’s will.
For if he had once granted man freedom and power of decision—and granted it worthily, as we have shown—he had certainly, by the very authority of the institution, granted them to be enjoyed; enjoyed, so far as in him, according to himself, that is according to God, that is unto good—for who permits anything against himself?
It followed, then, that God should withdraw from the freedom once conceded to man—that is, that he should hold back in himself both his foresight and his preeminent power, by which he could have intervened so that man, having set out to use his freedom badly, would not fall into danger.
For if he had intervened, he would have revoked the freedom of decision which he had permitted by reason and goodness. Suppose he had intervened, suppose he had revoked that freedom of decision by calling him back from the tree and keeping the beguiling serpent from meeting the woman: would Marcion not cry, ‘O futile, unstable, unfaithful Lord, undoing what he instituted’?
Why did he permit free decision if he intervenes? Why intervene if he permitted? Let him choose where to mark himself with error—in the institution or in the revocation. So whisper now for the Creator, who exercised seriousness and faithfulness in his institutions as both rational and good.
Latin
Hac definitione omnia deo salua sunt: et natura bonitatis et ratio dispositionis et praescientiae et potentiae copia. exigere tamen a deo debes et grauitatem summam et fidem praecipuam in omni institutione eius, ut desinas quaerere, an deo nolente potuerit quid euenire. tenens enim grauitatem et fidem dei, bonis et rationalibus institutionibus eius uindicandas, nec illud miraberis, quod deus non intercesserit aduersus ea, quae noluit euenire, ut conseruaret ea, quae uoluit. si enim semel homini permiserat arbitrii libertatem et potestatem et digne permiserat, sicut ostendimus, utique fruendas eas ex ipsa institutionis auctoritate permiserat, fruendas autem, quantum in ipso, secundum ipsum, id est secundum deum, id est in bonum, - quis enim aduersus se permittet aliquid? — qu-antum uero in homine, secundum motus libertatis ipsius, — quis enim non hoc praestat ei, cui quid semel frui, praestat, ut pro animo et arbitrio suo fruatur? — igitur consequens erat, uti deus secederet a libertate semel\'concessa homini, id est contineret in semetipso et praescientiam et praepotentiam suam, per quas intercessisse potuisset, quominus homo male libertate sua frui adgressus in periculum laberetur. si enim intercessisset, rescidisset arbitrii libertatem, quam ratione et bonitate permiserat. denique puta intercessisse, puta rescidisse illum arbitrii libertatem, dum reuocat ab arbore, dum ipsum circumscriptorem colubrum a congressu feminae arcet: nonne exclamaret Marcion: o dominum futtilem, instabilem, infidelem, rescindentem quae instituit? cur permiserat liberum arbitrium, si intercedit? cur intercedit, si permisit? eligat, ubi semetipsum erroris notet. (in) institutione an in rescissione. nonne tunc magis deceptus ex impraescientia futuri uideretur, cum obstitisset? et quod quasi ignorans, quomodo euasurum esset, indulserat, quis non diceret? sed et si praescierat male hominem institutione sua usurum, quid tam dignum deo quam grauitas, quam fides institutionum qualiumcumque? uidisset homo, si non bene dispunxisset quod bene acceperat. ipse legi reus fuisset, cui obsequi noluisset, non (deus.) aut legislator ipse fraudem legi suae faceret, non sinendo praescriptum eius impleri? I haec dignissime peroraturus in creatorem, si libero arbitrio hominis ex prouidentia et potentia, qua exigis, obstitisset, nunc tibi insusurra pro creatore, et grauitatem [et patientiam] et fidem (in) institutionibus suis functo ut et rationalibus et bonis.