Tertullian — Against Marcion 2.6
Since from this we are already understood to be building up man’s free power of decision, so that what befell him should be blamed not on God but on himself, lest you now object that he ought not to have been so instituted if freedom and power of decision were going to be ruinous, I will first defend that he ought to have been so instituted, so that I may more strongly commend that he was so instituted and worthily of God, when the stronger cause that made him so instituted is shown.
God’s goodness and his reason will also patronize this institution, conspiring in all things with our God. For reason without goodness is not reason, nor goodness without reason goodness—unless perhaps with Marcion’s god there is irrational good, as we have shown.
God had to be known—this is good and rational. Something worthy had to exist that would know God. What could be foreseen as so worthy as the image and likeness of God? Therefore the image and likeness of God had to be instituted of free decision and of its own power—in which this very thing would be counted the image and likeness of God, namely freedom and power of decision.
So that man might already have the good as his own, emancipated to him from God, there was assigned to him from the institution, as a weigher of the good emancipated from God, freedom and power of decision, which would make the good be rendered already of his own accord—since the reason of goodness also demanded that it be exercised voluntarily, from freedom of decision.
Therefore whole freedom of decision was granted him toward either side, that as his own master he might steadily meet good by keeping it willingly and evil by avoiding it willingly—since a man placed under God’s judgment had to make that judgment just from the deserts of his free decision. Otherwise neither reward for good nor for evil would rightly be weighed to one found good or evil by necessity, not by willing. In this the law too was set, not excluding but proving freedom by obedience willingly rendered or transgression willingly committed.
Latin
Sed quoniam ex hoc iam intellegimur eo struentes liberam hominis potestatem arbitrii sui, ut quod ei euenit non deo, sed ipsi debeat exprobrari, ne et tu hinc iam opponas non ita illum institui debuisse, si libertas et potestas arbitrii exitiosa futura esset, hoc quoque prius defendam ita institui debuisse, quo fortius commendem et ita institutum et digne deo institutum, potiore ostensa ea causa, quae ita fecit institui. bonitas dei et ratio eius huic quoque instituto patrocinabuntur, in omnibus conspirantes apud deum nostrum. nec ratio enim sine bonitate ratio est nec bonitas sine ratione bonitas, nisi forte penes deum Marcionis inrationaliter bonum, sicut ostendimus. oportebat deum cognosci. bonum hoc utique et rationale. oportebat dignum aliquid esse, quod deum cognosceret. quid tam dignum prospici posset quam imago dei et similitudo? et hoc bonum sine dubio et rationale. oportebat igitur imaginem et similitudinem dei liberi arbitrii et suae potestatis institui, in qua hoc ipsum imago et similitudo dei deputaretur, arbitrii scilicet libertas et potestas. in quam rem ea substantia homini accommodata est, quae huius status esset, adflatus dei, utique liberi et suae potestatis. sed et alias quale erat, ut totius mundi possidens homo non inprimis animi sui possessione regnaret, aliorum dominus sui famulus? habes igitur et bonitatem dei agnoscere ex dignatione et rationem ex dispositione. sola nunc bonitas deputetur quae tantum homini largita sit, id est arbitrii libertatem; aliud sibi ratio defendat: in eiusmodi institutionem. nam bonus natura deus solus. qui enim quod est sine initio habet, non institutione habet illud. sed natura. homo autem, qui totus ex institutione est, habens initium, cum initio sortitus est formam, qua esset, atque ita non natura in bonum dispositus est, sed institutione, non suum habens bonus esse, quia non natura in bonum dispositus est, sed institutione, secundum institutorem bonum, scilicet bonorum conditorem. ut ergo bonum iam suum haberet homo, emancipatum sibi a deo, et fieret proprietas iam boni in homine et quodammodo natura, de institutione adscripta est illi quasi libripens emancipati a deo boni libertas et potestas arbitrii, quae efficeret bonum ut proprium iam sponte praestari ab homine, — quoniam hoc et ratio bonitatis exigeret. uoluntarie exercendae, ex libertate scilicet arbitrii, non fauente . institutioni non seruiente — ut ita demum bonus consisteret homo, si secundum institutionem quidem, sed ex uoluntate iam bonus inueniretur, quasi de proprietate naturae, \' proinde ut et contra malum — nam et illud utique deus prouidebat — ut fortior homo praetenderet, liber scilicet et suae potestatis. quia si careret hoc iure, ut bonum quoque non uoluntate obiret sed necessitate, usurpabilis etiam malo futurus esset ex infirmitate seruitii, proinde et malo sicut bono famulus. tota ergo libertas arbitrii in utramque partem concessa est illi, ut sui dominus constanter occurreret et bono sponte seruando et malo sponte uitando, quoniam et alias positum hominem sub iudicio dei oportebat iustum illud efficere de arbitrii sui meritis. liberi scilicet. ceterum nec boni nec mali merces iure pensaretur ei, qui aut bonus aut malus necessitate fuisset inuentus, non uoluntate. in hoc et lex constituta est, non excludens, sed probans libertatem de obsequio sponte praestando uel transgressione sponte committenda: ita in utrumque exitum libertas patuit arbitrii. igitur si et bonitas et ratio dei inuenitur circa libertatem arbitrii concessam homini, non oportet omissa prima definitione bonitatis atque rationis, quae ante omnem tractatum ; constituenda est. post (e) factis praeiudicare non ita deum instituere debuisse, quia aliter quam deo deceret euasit, sed dispecto, quia ita debuerit instituere, saluo eo quod dispectum est cetera explorare. ceterum facile est offendentes statim in hominis ruinam, antequam condicionem eius inspexerint, in auctorem referre quod accidit, quia nec auctoris examinata sit ratio. denique et bonitas dei a primordio operum perspecta persuadebit nihil a deo mali euenire potuisse, et libertas hominis recogitata se potius ream ostendet (eius,) quod ipsa commisit.-