Refuting the claim that Christ's soul was made visible by becoming flesh
Tertullian is answering the view of Apelles and his followers that Christ took a soul-made body so that the previously invisible soul could be seen.
But let us meet them on another argument, demanding why Christ, by taking on flesh made of soul, should be thought to have had a fleshly soul. For God, they say, eagerly desired to display a visible soul to human beings by making it a body—a soul that had previously been invisible, seeing nothing by nature, not even itself, because of the hindrance of this flesh, so that it was even debated whether the soul had been born or not. And so the soul was made a body in Christ, so that we might see it being born, dying, and—what is more—rising again. But what sort of thing was this, that the soul should be demonstrated through flesh to itself or to us, when it could not be recognized through flesh, and so it was shown by becoming the very thing in which it lay hidden—that is, flesh? It took on darkness, apparently, so that it could shine. Let us first reconsider, then, whether the soul ought to have been displayed in this way, and then whether they claim it was entirely invisible before—whether as incorporeal, or as having some kind of body of its own. And yet when they call it invisible, they make it corporeal, since it has something that is invisible. For how can something be called invisible if it has nothing invisible? But it cannot even exist unless it has something through which it exists. And since it exists, it must have something through which it exists. If it has something through which it exists, that will be its body. Everything that exists is a body of its own kind. Nothing is incorporeal except what does not exist. Therefore, since the soul has an invisible body, the one who undertook to make it visible would surely have done better to make visible that part of it which was invisible, because neither falsehood nor weakness befits God—falsehood, if he displayed the soul as something other than it was; weakness, if he was unable to display what it was. No one who wants to show a man puts a helmet or a mask on him. But this is what happened to the soul, if, changed in flesh, it put on a foreign surface. But even if the soul is considered incorporeal, so that by some force of reason the soul is indeed hidden, yet whatever the soul is, it is not a body—still, it would not have been impossible for God, and it would have suited his purpose more fittingly, to display it in some new kind of body rather than in this common one shared by all, which was already known, lest he should have eagerly desired without cause to make the soul visible from invisible, exposed, of course, to these very questions by the laying of human flesh as a covering upon it. But Christ could not be seen among human beings except as a man. Give back therefore to Christ the faith that is his: that he who chose to walk as a man also displayed a soul of human condition, not making it fleshly, but clothing it in flesh.
Latin
Sed aliam argumentationem, eorum convenimus, exigentes cur animalem carnem subeundo Christus animam carnalem videatur habuisse. Deus enim, inquiunt, gestivit animam visibilem hominibus exhibere, faciendo eam corpus, quae retro invisibilis extiterit, natura nihil, nec semetipsam, videns prae impedimento carnis huius, ut etiam disceptaretur nata anima an non. Itaque animam corpus effectam in Christo, ut eam et nascentem et morientem, et quod sit amplius, resurgentem videremus. Et hoc autem quale erat ut per carnem demonstraretur anima sibi aut nobis, quae per carnem non poterat agnosci, ut sic ostenderetur, dum id fit cui latebat, id est caro? Tenebras videlicet accepit ut lucere posset. Denique ad hoc prius retractemus an isto modo ostendenda fuerit anima, dehinc an in totum invisibilem eam retro allegent, utrum quasi incorporalem, an etiam habentem aliquod genus corporis proprii. Et tamen cum invisibilem dicant, corporalem eam constituunt, habentem quod invisibile sit. Nihil enim habens invisibile quomodo potest invisibilis dici? Sed ne esse quidem potest nisi habens per quod sit. Cum autem sit, habeat necesse est aliquid per quod est. Si habet aliquid per quod est, hoc erit corpus eius. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis. Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est. Habente igitur anima invisibile corpus, qui visibilem eam facere susceperat utique dignius id eius visibile fecisset quod invisibile habebatur, quia nec hic mendacium aut infirmitas deo competit; mendacium, si aliud animam quam quod erat demonstravit, infirmitas, si id quod erat demonstrare non valuit. Nemo ostendere volens hominem cassidem aut personam ei inducit. Hoc autem factum est animae, si in carne conversa alienam induit superficiem. Sed et si incorporalis anima deputetur, ut aliqua vi rationis occulta sit quidem anima, corpus tamen non sit, quicquid est anima, proinde impossibile deo non erat, et proposito eius congruentius competebat, nova aliqua corporis specie eam demonstrare quam ista communi omnium, alterius iam notitiae, ne sine causa visibilem ex invisibili facere gestisset animam, istis scilicet quaestionibus opportunam, per carnis in illam humanae defensionem. Sed non poterat Christus inter homines nisi homo videri. Redde igitur Christo fidem suam, ut qui homo voluerit incedere, animam quoque humanae condicionis ostenderit, non faciens eam carneam, sed induens eam carne.