FathersVia Patrum

On the Imputation of Adam's First Sin · §332

Man. Post. Cap. VI: PLAC Aristotle / Decalogue non concupisces tip

Just as therefore the sensitive appetite, though in its genus only sensitive, yet in man can be viewed insofar as it is somehow rational and, as Aristotle says, partaking of reason, and so is capable of virtue and can be ruled by law; so the generative faculty, though generically viewed in no way moral, yet insofar as it is a faculty of man, by whose appetite it is somehow ruled and which attempts generation—why can it not so far be called somehow moral? Which the learned man himself seems to hint enough when he says it is often not moved by the empire of the will: for he seems to concede that it is sometimes moved by the empire of the will. Why then can it not so far be called moral? I meant nothing else than that insofar as it depends on appetite or lust, and works seed suited to the moral faculties, it was so far corrupted, and as by nature's reason it tends to producing a man, so by reason of corruption it tends to producing a corrupt man. What in that is worthy of so sharp a rebuke? Indeed for the generative faculty, if viewed by that generic account of it, there is the same reason as for the nutritive or augmentative; but not if viewed by the specific account it has in man, on whose appetite it depends. For the concoctive as concoctive, or nutritive as nutritive, in no way depends on the will, but only accidentally, insofar as each follows the taking of food which depends on the will. But generation as such is somehow in the power of will or appetite: for fathers never generate without appetite concurring, and they can even abstain from generating perpetually if they will. Why then can the faculty of generating, like that of eating, not be ruled by law? And to what does the Decalogue's command, You shall not covet, pertain?

Latin

Sicut ergo appetitus sensitivus, quamvis genere suo nonnisi sensitivus sit, tamen in homine spectari potest, quatenus est aliquo modo rationalis, &, ut loquitur Aristoteles, logou metechon, atque ita & virtutis capax est, & lege regi potest; Sic facultas generatrix, licet generice spectata nullo modo moralis sit, tamen quatenus est facultas hominis, cuius & appetitu aliquomodo regitur, & generationem molitur, quid est cur eatenus moralis aliquomodo dici non possit? Id quod ipse vir doctus innuere satis videtur cum ait, eam imperio voluntatis saepe non moveri: concedere enim videtur, eam imperio voluntatis aliquando moveri. Quid est igitur quamobrem eatenus non possit appellari moralis? Nihil igitur aliud volui, nisi eam quatenus ab appetitu seu libidine dependet, & elaborat semen accommodate ad facultates morales, eatenus corruptam fuisse, atque, ut ratione naturae tendit ad productionem hominis, sic ratione corruptionis tendit ad productionem hominis corrupti. Quid est ea in re, dignum tam acri reprehensione? Est quidem facultatis generatricis, si secundum rationem illam suam genericam spectetur, eadem quae altricis, aut auctricis ratio: non vero, si secundum specificam, quam habet in homine, cuius ab appetitu dependet. Non enim concoctrix qua concoctrix, aut altrix qua altrix ullo modo dependet a voluntate, sed tantum per accidens, quatenus utraque cibi sumptionem sequitur pendentem a voluntate. Sed generatio qua talis aliquomodo in potestate est voluntatis seu appetitus: Nam nec generant unquam patres non concurrente appetitu, & possunt a generando etiam perpetuo abstinere si velint. Quid igitur est, cur, ut manducandi, sic generandi facultas lege regi non possit? Et quo pertinet mandatum Decalogi, non concupisces?

About this text

New English, free to read. Open any section below.

English follows the locked 1661 Saumur Latin of Capita I–XIV partial through Man. Post. Caput IX (eph-ho / eph-ho pantes) before eph-ho / eph-ho pantes, reconstructed from IA PDF page images with Vision OCR and pdftotext as check. No modern English was copied. Cap. IX deepen+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

IA deimputationepri00lapl. Densify: Capita I–XII + Caput XIV + Man. Post. Cap. II–VI through Cap. X Rom. 5:14 tip. Not whole Disputatio; Cap. X Rom. 5:14+ / ~494 pp Disputatio remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.