Against Celsus, Book IV · §96 · Origen of Alexandria

Foreknowledge is not in itself divine

We must know that foreknowing the future is not in every case divine. In itself it is something indifferent, and it falls to bad and good alike. Physicians, at any rate, foreknow certain things from the art of medicine, even if they are bad in character; and so too pilots, even if they are wicked, foreknow signs of weather, violent winds and changes in the air, from a certain experience and observation; and surely no one will say on that account that they are divine, if they happen to be wicked in character.

False, then, is what Celsus says: “What could one call more divine than to foreknow and foretell the future?” False also is the claim that “many animals lay claim to a notion of the divine”; for none of the irrational animals has a notion of God. False also is the claim that the irrational animals are “nearer to converse with the divine”; since even among men those who are still bad, even if they make the utmost progress, are far from converse with the divine.

Only those, then, who are truly wise and genuinely devout are nearer to converse with the divine. Such are our prophets, and Moses, to whom, because of his great purity, Scripture bore witness, saying: “Moses alone shall draw near to God, but the rest shall not draw near” (Exodus 24:2).

Greek

Χρὴ δ᾿ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὸ τὰ μέλλοντα προγινώσκειν οὐ πάντως θεῖόν ἐστι· καθ᾿ αὑτὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐστὶ καὶ πῖπτον εἰς φαύλους καὶ ἀστείους. καὶ ἰατροὶ γοῦν ἀπὸ ἰατρικῆς προγινώσκουσί τινα, κἂν φαῦλοι τὸ ἦθος τυγχάνωσιν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ κυβερνῆται. κἂν μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες, προγινώσκουσιν ἐπισημασίας καὶ ἀνέμων σφοδρότητας καὶ τροπὰς περὶ τὸ περιέχον ἔκ τινος πείρας καὶ τηρήσεως· καὶ οὐ δή που παρὰ τοῦτο θείους τις αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσει, ἂν τύχωσι μοχθηροὶ εἶναι τὸ ἦθος· ψεῦδος οὖν τὸ παρὰ τῷ Κέλσῳ λεγόμενον, τό· τί ἂν φαίη τις θειότερον τοῦ τὰ μέλλοντα προγινώσκειν τε καὶ προδηλοῦν; ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι θείας ἐννοίας· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων ἔννοιαν ἔχει τοῦ θεοῦ. ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα· ὅπου γε καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ ἔτι φαῦλοι, κἂν ἐπ᾿ ἄκρον προκόπτωσι, πόῤῥω εἰσὶ τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας. μόνοι δὴ ἄρα οἱ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν σοφοὶ καὶ ἀψευδῶς εὐσεβεῖς ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας εἰσίν· ὁποῖοί εἰσιν οἱ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς προφῆται καὶ Μωϋσῆς. ᾧ μεμαρτύρηκε διὰ τὴν πολλὴν καθαρότητα ὁ λόγος εἰπών· „ἐγγιεῖ Μωϋσῆς μόνος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ οὐκ ἐγγιοῦσι.“

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Origen answers Celsus’s scorn for the belief that God or his Son comes down to the world, showing that the Word comes down without change and that God’s threats and punishments are a cure, not a fit of temper. He then defends the stories of Genesis and the patriarchs, read in their deeper sense, against the charge that they are silly tales, and rejects Celsus’s claim that the world was made no more for man than for the animals, which Celsus thought nearer to God than men.

Translated from the Greek of Koetschau, GCS 2–3 (1899), via the Perseus digital text, which serves as the base text. Each chapter was translated from the Greek and then checked clause by clause against it in a separate review. No earlier English translation was consulted.

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Translated from Koetschau GCS 2 – 3 (1899) — Greek (Greek · Book IV, chapters 1 – 99)

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