No rational soul is a worm
But suppose you scorn man’s littleness not because of the body but because of the soul, on the ground that it is inferior to the other rational beings, and especially to the virtuous ones, and inferior for this reason, that wickedness is in it. Why, then, are the bad among Christians and those among Jews who live evil lives any more a cluster of bats, or ants, or worms, or frogs, than the wicked among the other nations? On this reckoning anyone at all, and above all one given over to unrestrained wickedness, is a bat and a worm and a frog and an ant compared with the rest of humankind.
So even if a man is Demosthenes the orator, with wickedness like his and the deeds he did out of wickedness, or Antiphon, who is also reckoned an orator and who denied providence in the books entitled On Truth, a title like that of Celsus, none the less these men are worms rolling about in a corner of the mire of folly and ignorance.
And yet no rational being of any kind whatever could reasonably be compared to a worm, since it has starting points for virtue. For these first sketches of virtue do not allow those who have virtue in potential, and who cannot wholly lose its seeds, to be compared to a worm. It appears, then, that human beings in general could not be worms in relation to God, for reason, which takes its beginning from the Word who comes from God, does not allow the rational living being to be thought wholly alien to God. Nor could the bad among Christians and Jews, who in truth are neither Christians nor Jews, be compared to worms rolling about in a corner of the mire any more than the other bad.
And if the nature of reason does not allow us to accept even this, then plainly we shall not insult human nature, which was made for virtue, even if it sins through ignorance, nor shall we liken it to such animals.
Greek
Εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μικρότητα οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐξευτελίζετε ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς οὖσαν ὑποδεεστέραν τῶν λοιπῶν λογικῶν καὶ μάλιστα σπουδαίων καὶ διὰ τοῦθ᾿ ὑποδεεστέραν, ἐπείπερ ἡ κακία ἐστίν ἐν αὐτῇ, τί μᾶλλον οἱ ἐν Χριστιανοῖς φαῦλοι καὶ οἱ ἐν Ἰουδαίοις κακῶς βιοῦντες ὁρμαθός εἰσι νυκτερίδων ἢ μύρμηκες ἢ σκώληκες ἢ βάτραχοι, ἢ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσι μοχθηροί; ὡς κατὰ τοῦτο πάνθ᾿ ὁντιναοῦν, μάλιστα κεχυμένῃ τῇ κακίᾳ χρώμενον, νυκτερίδα καὶ σκώληκα καὶ βάτραχον καὶ μύρμηκα εἶναι ὡς πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους. κἂν Δημοσθένης τις οὖν ὁ ῥήτωρ ᾖ μετὰ τῆς παραπλησίας ἐκείνῳ κακίας καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ κακίας αὐτῷ πεπραγμένων, κἂν Ἀντιφῶν ἄλλος ῥήτωρ νομιζόμενος εἶναι, καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγεγραμμένοις περὶ ἀληθείας παραπλησίως τῇ Κέλσου ἐπιγραφῇ· οὐδὲν ἧττόν εἰσιν οὗτοι σκώληκες ἐν βορβόρου γωνίᾳ τοῦ τῆς ἀμαθίας καὶ ἀγνοίας καλινδούμενοι. καίτοι γε ὁποῖον δὴ τὸ λογικὸν οὐκ ἂν εὐλόγως σκώληκι παραβάλλοιτο, ἀφορμὰς ἔχον πρὸς ἀρετήν. αὗται γὰρ αἱ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὑποτυπώσεις οὐκ ἐῶσι σκώληκι παραβάλλεσθαι τοὺς δυνάμει ἔχοντας τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὰ σπέρματα αὐτῆς πάντῃ ἀπολέσαι οὐ δυναμένους. οὐκοῦν ἀναφαίνεται ὅτι οὔθ᾿ οἱ ἄνθρωποι καθόλου σκώληκες ἂν εἶεν ὡς πρὸς θεόν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἀπὸ τοῦ παρὰ θεοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον πάντῃ ἀλλότριον νο μισθῆναι θεοῦ· οὔτε μᾶλλον οἱ ἐν Χριστιανοῖς καὶ Ἰουδαίοις φαῦλοι. καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐ Χριστιανοὶ οὐδὲ Ἰουδαῖοι. τῶν λοιπῶν φαύλων παραβάλλοιντο ἐν γωνίᾳ βορβόρου καλινδουμένοις σκώληξιν. εἰ δ᾿ ἡ τοῦ λόγου φύσις οὐδὲ τοῦτο παραδέξασθαι ἐπιτρέπει, δηλονότι οὐχ ὑβρίσομεν τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν κατεσκευασμένην ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, κἂν δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ. οὐδ᾿ ἐξομοιώσομεν αὐτὴν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ζῴοις.