The Cameronians: no harm to the will's freedom
Thesis LXI. As for the will, the working of grace described above does necessarily draw out its consent, yet it in no way takes its freedom away, since it moves and determines the will only through the judgment of the practical intellect.
In these learned men's view, the necessity and determination of the will's acts that come from the mind's practical judgment do not stop those acts from proceeding freely from the will. The will's freedom is not opposed to every necessity, only to necessity that comes from outside force, from matter or from the senses.
This is argued more fully in Moses Amyraldus' treatise on free will, especially section 4, and likewise in Josua Placeus' posthumous book on the same subject.
Latin
LXI. Ex parte vero voluntatis, quanquam quae descripta est gratiae operatio, necessario ejus consensum eliciat, nullatenus tamen illi libertatem adimit. Nec enim voluntatem movet, & determinat, nisi per intellectus practici judicium. Sed ex virorum illorum doctorum sententia, necessitas & determinatio actuum voluntatis, quae ex mentis practicae judicio oritur, non obstat quominus libere a voluntate procedant: quandoquidem libertas voluntatis non opponitur cuivis necessitati, sed illi tantum, quae est a vi externa, a materia, vel a sensu. Quae latius diducta videre est apud Mosen Amyraldum tractatu de libero arbitrio, praecipue Sectione quarta. Et similiter in libro posthumo Josuae Placei de eodem argumento.