The natural motion toward hope
Thesis XCVIII. Suppose there is an affection toward something that the mind conceives as lovable and presents to the will, and the mind then sees a way and an approach by which it believes the thing can be obtained. A motion then also rises naturally in the will, a kind of uplift toward hoping, which comes before the free act of hope in time or in nature.
That motion is produced by the knowledge of the object's goodness and the knowledge of the way it is believed it can be obtained, with the will cooperating not as free but as a kind of nature. It rises naturally in the will, and it is the stronger, the greater and more probable is the knowledge of the object's goodness and of the way to obtain it. The same holds for the will's affection toward an object known simply as good.
Latin
XCVIII. Quod si existente affectu ad aliquam rem, quam mens ut amabilem concipit, & voluntati offert, menti occurrat via & aditus, quo obtineri posse credatur, naturaliter etiam consurgit in voluntate motus quidam quasi erectionis illius ad sperandum, qui tempore, vel natura, antecedit actum liberum spei. Adeoque motus ille a notitia bonitatis objecti, & notitia viae qua obtineri posse creditur, cooperante voluntate, non ut libera, sed natura quaedam est, efficitur; exurgitque naturaliter in voluntate, eo major, quo notitia bonitatis objecti, & viae qua obtineri possit, major & verisimilior est, sicuti se res habet in affectu illo voluntatis ad objectum cognitum simpliciter ut bonum.