Thesis XCVII. Once such a motion has arisen in the will from contemplating the thing, it is in the will's power simply to will the thing or not to will it. The motion by which the will is drawn toward the thing, however, does not arise freely, as was said; it arises in the will purely by nature once the thing is contemplated.
Still, the will can hinder that motion in itself indirectly: by keeping the thought away, by turning to other matters, and by seeing to it that the mind sets before the will other things that usually draw it toward the very opposite.
Latin
XCVII. Porro post ejusmodi motum in voluntate ex rei contemplatione exortum, in voluntatis potestate situm est, rem simpliciter velle vel non velle. Sed motus iste, quo ad rem afficitur, non libere, ut jam dictum, sed mere naturaliter in voluntate oritur, posita rei contemplatione. Voluntas tamen indirecte potest hujusmodi motum in se impedire, arcendo nempe cogitationem, & divertendo ad alia, ac procurando ut mens voluntati alia proponat, quae eam ad omnino contraria allicere solent.