Besides, God's absolute predefinition before the will's determination is foreseen brings an antecedent necessity
Add this. Suppose that before decreeing anything about us God foreknows what the will would do on the supposition that it is placed in such circumstances and such motives are brought to bear. Still, if God foreordains something as simply going to happen before the absolute determination of our will is foreseen, an antecedent necessity arises from it, since what God predefines must without fail come to be.
This necessity seems no less at odds with freedom than if no such conditional knowledge had gone before, since that knowledge does not put such a decree of God in our power.
Latin
XXXVI. Adde quod, etsi Deus, priusquam aliquid de nobis decernat, praesciat quid voluntas factura sit, ex hypothesi quod constituatur in talibus circumstantiis, & ejusmodi motiva accedant; tamen si Deus aliquid simpliciter futurum praefinit, ante praevisam absolute voluntatis nostrae determinationem, inde nascitur quaedam necessitas antecedens, quandoquidem quod Deus praedefinit omnino necesse est fore: quae necessitas non minus libertati repugnare videtur, quam si nulla talis scientia conditionata praecessisset, cum scientia ista non faciat ut tale Dei decretum sit in nostra potestate.