Against the middle-knowledge view: hard to reconcile with victorious, efficacious grace taught by the orthodox School
Take first the opinion that sets before the divine decrees a conditional knowledge of how the will would lean and incline, one way or the other, if a given occasion for acting were offered it. It holds that God foreordained men's actions only in that he willed to create them in that state and offer them those occasions for acting.
From this he foresaw that, with his general concurrence, they would act in such a way and would produce these volitions rather than those. They would do so not by any necessity laid on them by the objects themselves or by some action of God, but because they would so determine themselves of their own accord, the contrary being in their power.
This opinion, I say, does avoid many of the awkward consequences that press on the others. But it can hardly be reconciled with the grace that conquers and is efficacious of itself, which brings free choice under itself and is by no means to be made subject to free choice, as the orthodox School proclaims.
Latin
XXXV. Etenim sententia illa quae divinis decretis praestruit scientiam conditionatam de futura inclinatione & propensione voluntatis in hanc vel illam partem, si talis occasio agendi ipsi offeratur; Et quae statuit Deum non aliter praeordinavisse hominum actiones, quam quia voluit illos in eo statu creare, illasque occasiones agendi iis offerre, unde consequi praevidebat illos, mediante ipsius generali concursu, tali modo acturos, & has potius quam illas volitiones elicituros esse non necessitate quadam, vel ab objectis ipsis, vel ab aliqua Dei actione imposita, sed quia ipsi per se sic se essent determinaturi, cum contrarium esset in eorum potestate: haec, inquam, sententia multa quidem incommoda vitat quibus urgentur aliae sententiae: sed cum ea difficulter conciliari potest gratia victrix & per se efficax, quae liberum sibi subjicit arbitrium, minime vero libero arbitrio subjicienda est, quam praedicat Schola orthodoxa.