Arminius does not say how determination and indifference cohere; his disciples (Grevinchoven) use middle knowledge
He does not clearly explain how these two things fit together: that an action is determined by God's eternal decree, and yet, with that determination in place, the will always remains indifferent to the action and always able to produce it or not.
From what he adds, however, he leaves us to infer that it works like this. To carry out his decrees about human acts, God moves men's wills only by supplying and setting before them objects and arguments that do induce them to will, yet in such a way that it always remains in their power not to be moved by those objects.
His disciples, such as Nicolaus Grevinchoven among others, expressly bring in middle knowledge to untie this knot, as most Jesuits do, in the way set out in the preceding theses.
Latin
II. Porro distincte non explicat quomodo ista simul constent, ut actio quaedam aeterno Dei decreto determinata sit, & tamen posita illa determinatione voluntas semper maneat indifferens ad talem actionem, & possit semper illam elicere, vel non elicere. Ex iis tamen quae subjungit colligendum relinquit rem ita se habere, quoniam Deus ut sua decreta circa hominum actus exequatur, non aliter movet eorum voluntatem quam iis administrando & proponendo ea objecta atque argumenta, quibus ad volendum quidem inducantur, sed ita tamen ut semper in eorum potestate sit objectis illis non moveri. Verum illius Discipuli, ut inter alios Nicolaus Grevinchovius, ad nodum hunc solvendum diserte adhibent scientiam mediam, sicuti solent Jesuitae plurimi, qua ratione thesibus praecedentibus expositum fuit.