Arminius and the Remonstrants side with Molina; Arminius's two senses of determination
James Arminius, and those in the Low Countries who followed his teachings and are called Remonstrants, agree with Molina and his disciples in explaining the nature of human freedom. They also seem to reconcile that freedom with the decrees of God's providence in the same way. Arminius's teaching in his Response to Article 7, Works page 143, at least points that way.
There he does not deny that God by his eternal decree predefined and predetermined future contingents. But he distinguishes two kinds of divine determination by which God settles that something shall happen. In the first, whatever action, motion or impulse of God is in place, the free second cause remains free both in its power and in the use of that power to act or not act, so that it can suspend its action if it wishes.
In the second, once God's action, motion and impulse are in place, the second cause does not remain free, at least not in the use of its power so as to be able to suspend its action. Instead it is necessarily bent to one side, its indifference to either side being removed, before the determined act is produced by the free creature.
If 'determination' is taken in the first sense, he does not deny that God so determines future free and contingent things. If it is taken in the second sense, he flatly denies that God by his decree determined future contingents to one side or the other.
Latin
THESIS I. JACOBUS Arminius, & qui ejus dogmata in Belgio secuti Remonstrantes dicuntur, quemadmodum in explicanda libertatis humanae natura, cum Molina & ejus discipulis consentiunt; ita quoque videntur eam eodem modo cum Providentiae Divinae decretis conciliare. Saltem huc tendunt quae docet Arminius Responsione ad Articulum 7. Operum ipsius pagina 143. Ubi non negat quidem Deum Decreto suo aeterno futura contingentia praedefinivisse & praedeterminasse; sed distinguit duplicem Dei determinationem qua statuit ut aliquid fiat: Unam talem, qua, posita qualicunque actione, motione, impulsu Dei, causa secunda libera manet quoad potentiam & usum potentiae, ad agendum, vel non agendum, adeo ut actionem suam, si velit, suspendere possit. alteram talem, qua posita non manet libera causa secunda, saltem non ad usum potentiae, ut actionem suam suspendere possit, posita actione, motione, & impulsu Dei; sed ex qua fit ut necessario in alteram partem flectatur, ablata indifferentia ad alterutram partem; antequam actus ipse determinatus productus sit a creatura libera. Si priore modo vox determinationis intelligatur, talem determinationem Dei non negat respectu futurorum liberorum & contingentium. Sed si secundo sensu sumatur vox determinationis, plane negat Deum futura contingentia decreto suo determinasse ad alterutram partem.