Strang's reason proves too much: by it God could foreknow no absolute contingent he had not decreed, which Strang denies
His reason, as reported above, is that nothing can be known with certainty that is not certainly true, and nothing is certainly true that is not necessary either absolutely or on a hypothesis. He concludes that conditional futures cannot be the object of God's knowledge, which is infallible and entirely certain, unless the condition includes something from which what is called future follows necessarily.
But if this argument held, God could foreknow no contingent thing as absolutely future except what he had first decreed to be absolutely future. Yet Strang does not accept that, since he grants that people freely do many things to which God does not predetermine them.
Latin
LX. Ratio autem ejus est, ut supra retulimus, quod nihil certo cognosci potest quod non sit certo verum: nihil autem certo verum est quod necessarium non sit vel absolute, vel ex hypothesi. Unde colligit futura conditionata non posse esse objectum scientiae divinae, quae infallibilis & certissima est, nisi in conditione includatur aliquid unde quod dicitur futurum necessario inferatur. Sed si haec ratio valeret, nullum contingens Deus praescire posset tanquam absolute futurum, nisi quod prius absolute futurum decrevisset: quod tamen non admittit Strangius, qui fatetur homines multa libere agere ad quae a Deo non praedeterminantur.