Strang, though no predeterminist, still denies that free contingents are knowable from a hypothesis that does not necessitate
Even some who hold that certain free acts are absolutely future, and are foreknown as such by God without any decree predetermining free causes to those acts, still deny that God can know free contingent futures on any supposition that does not necessarily entail the determination of the created will, and so does not include an absolute decree that these acts shall be future. The very learned Strang is one of them.
This can be seen in Strang himself, On the Will of God concerning Sin, book 3, chapter 11.
Latin
LIX. Sed etiam nonnulli eorum qui statuunt quosdam actus liberos absolute esse futuros, & ut tales a Deo praesciri, absque ullo decreto causas liberas ad istos actus praedeterminandi, ut Doctissimus Strangius; negant tamen futura contingentia libera a Deo cognosci posse ex ulla hypothesi quae non infert necessario determinationem voluntatis creatae, & proinde quae non includit absolutum decretum de eorum futuritione. Ut apud eundem Strangium videre est de Voluntate Dei circa peccatum, lib. 3. cap. 11.