Predeterminists require a predetermining decree in the condition; Le Blanc denies predetermination to evil acts lest God author sin
All the theologians who think nothing happens without God's concurrence applying and predetermining the second cause to act insist that no proposition about contingent conditional futures has any truth, or can be known as true, unless a decree to premove and predetermine the free agent is assumed in the condition.
They hold that the futurity of every action depends on such a decree, and some even make it the sole and only cause. Without such a decree, they say, no action of a second cause can be future.
Our view, however, is that second causes do many things in time to which God does not predetermine them. We do not see how God would escape being the author of sin if he predetermined free causes to acts that are vicious in themselves and intrinsically evil, such as blasphemy and hatred of God.
But if a free cause can perform some action without God's premotion and predetermination, then for an action to be future, or to be such that it would be future, there is no need to posit or suppose in God a decree to premove and predetermine the creature to act. A decree to provide the concurrence without which the creature can do nothing, and which its action really needs, is enough.
Latin
LIV. Omnes illi Theologi qui sine concursu Dei causam secundam ad agendum applicante & praedeterminante nihil fieri existimant, pertendunt nullam propositionem de futuris contingentibus & conditionatis veritatem aliquam habere, adeoque ut veram esse cognoscibilem, nisi in conditione supponatur decretum de agente libero praemovendo & praedeterminando. Volunt enim actionis cujuscunque futuritionem a tali decreto pendere, imo juxta nonnullos, tanquam a causa unica atque solitaria, & sine tali decreto nullam causae secundae actionem futuram esse posse. Verum in ea sumus sententia causas secundas multa in tempore agere ad quae a Deo non praedeterminantur. Nec enim videmus quomodo Deus autor peccati non esset, si praedeterminaret causas liberas ad actus per se vitiosos & intrinsece malos, verbi causa ad blasphemiam, & ad Dei odium. Si autem actio aliqua causae liberae esse potest sine Dei praemotione & praedeterminatione, ad hoc ut actio aliqua futura sit, vel futura esset, non necesse est poni, vel supponi in Deo decretum de creatura ad agendum praemovenda & praedeterminanda: sed sufficit decretum de eo concursu praebendo, sine quo creatura nihil agere potest, & qui ad ejus actionem revera necessarius est.