So all must grant conditional knowledge before any actual decree; the only question is what decree the condition includes
So it cannot reasonably be denied, and everyone ought to grant, that God has a certain knowledge of what is freely and contingently future under a certain condition, before we conceive of any actual decree in God about future things.
The whole difficulty is this. Must the condition under which something is said to be future include a decree to premove and predetermine the second cause to act? Or is it enough that the decree which that condition would require in God be simply a decree to provide a concurrence that is of itself indifferent and is determined by the second cause to a particular kind of action?
Latin
LIII. Negari ergo cum aliqua ratione non potest, & debet ab omnibus concedi, dari in Deo scientiam quandam eorum quae libere & contingenter futura sunt, sub certa conditione, antequam ullum actuale de rebus futuris decretum in Deo concipiamus. Tota difficultas est An conditio sub qua res futura dicitur, includere debeat decretum de causa secunda ad agendum praemovenda ac praedeterminanda, an vero sufficiat ut decretum, quod juxta conditionem illam in Deo ponendum esset, sit solum de praebendo concursu quodam ex se indifferenti, & qui a causa secunda ad certam actionis speciem determinetur.