They do not deny all knowledge of conditional futures, but derive it from absolute decrees about what really happens
Even so, they do not deny that God has any knowledge of things that would be or would have been contingently future under a condition that has never been, and never will be, fulfilled. They grant that some things of this kind are foretold in Scripture and so were known to God and clearly seen by him. What they insist on is that this knowledge did not come before the free decree of God's will.
This is not because they allow in God conditional decrees, by which he wills something to happen under a condition that will never obtain. Nor do they allow explicit, formal decrees about the connection of two events, neither of which will actually exist. Their reason is that, given this or that condition, it follows from certain absolute decrees of God about things that will really happen that these or those things would have come about.
Latin
XXXIX. Neque tamen negant omnem in Deo scientiam eorum quae essent, vel fuissent contingenter futura, sub aliqua conditione, quae nunquam posita est, nec etiam unquam ponenda. Agnoscunt enim ejusmodi quaedam in scriptura praedici, adeoque Deo nota & perspecta fuisse. Sed pertendunt istam scientiam non praecessisse liberum voluntatis divinae decretum. Non quod admittant in Deo decreta quaedam conditionata, quibus velit aliquid fieri sub conditione quae nunquam locum habitura est: aut etiam explicita & formalia decreta de connexione duorum eventuum quorum neutrum revera existet: sed quoniam ex absolutis quibusdam Dei decretis de rebus reapse futuris sequitur, posita tali, vel tali conditione, haec & illa futura fuisse.