They reject as absurd infinite decrees about connections of possibles (Rutherford, Voetius); so Strang and Twisse
They consider absurd the view of those who ascribe to God countless decrees about contingent connections between any one possible thing and another. This includes cases where no order, subordination or coherence appears. It is as though God had decreed whatever would happen in the countless worlds he could create, under countless different conditions.
This is the view just reported from Samuel Rutherford and from Voetius's theses. John Strang expressly rejects it in his treatise On the Will and Actions of God concerning Sin, book 1, chapter 5, and book 3, chapter 13. So does Twisse in his dissertation on middle knowledge, book 3, page 472.
Latin
XXXVIII. Etenim absurdam putant sententiam eorum qui infinita decreta Deo tribuunt de connexionibus contingentibus cujuscunque possibilis cum altero possibili, etiam in iis in quibus nullus ordo, subordinatio, aut cohaerentia apparet. Quasi Deus decrevisset quaecunque futura essent in infinitis mundis a se creabilibus, suppositis infinitis diversis conditionibus. Quae est sententia jamjam ex Samuele Retorforti, & Thesibus Voetii relata: quam expresse rejicit Strangius, Tractatu de Voluntate & Actionibus Dei circa peccatum, lib. 1. cap. 5. & lib. 3. cap. 13. Et Tuissus quoque in dissertatione de scientia Media, lib. 3. pag. 472.