Nor can God see as certain what has no certain existence in itself or its cause (against Becanus)
There is a further serious difficulty. Suppose a thing depends on a cause that is undetermined in itself and is as able not to produce it as to produce it. How can the divine intellect still know it with certainty, when on this account it has no certain existence either in itself or in its cause?
The divine intellect, however infinite, cannot see what does not exist, and it does not alter the nature of its object. Nor would its perception and grasp be true if, as some say, it knew more in the cause than is actually there. See Becanus, volume 1, treatise 1, chapter 10, question 7.
Latin
XLII. Ac praeterea illud magna difficultate non caret, quomodo res quae supponitur pendere a causa quae est in se indeterminata, & quae illam tam non producere quam producere potest, certo tamen ab intellectu divino cognosci queat, cum sic nec in se, nec in sua causa certam habeat ullam existentiam. Nam intellectus divinus, quantumlibet infinitus, non potest videre quod non est, nec objecti sui naturam immutat. Neque vera esset ejus perceptio, atque apprehensio, si, ut aiunt nonnulli, plus cognosceret in causa, quam de facto in ipsa sit. Becanus tom. 1. tract. 1. cap. 10. quaest. 7.