Yet it leaves the main question: whence contingents become future, which points back to the decree
Yet although that view contains nothing but truth, it does very little to answer the question and does not remove the main difficulty. The hardest thing to understand here is where contingent things get their being future from. How do they pass from eternity out of mere possibility into the status of future things, so that God can perceive them as future?
It seems that no appeal is possible here except to the decree of God's will, since from eternity nothing existed outside God to which that change could be ascribed.
Latin
XLI. Sed quamvis ista sententia nil nisi verum contineat, quaestioni tamen minime satisfacit, neque praecipuam difficultatem tollit. Quod enim hic maxime intellectu difficile est, illud est unde habeant contingentia quod futura sint, & ex mere possibilibus, ab aeterno in naturam futurorum transeant, ut sub ea ratione possint a Deo percipi. Nec enim ad aliud hic videtur recurri posse, quam ad divinae voluntatis decretum, cum ab aeterno nihil extra Deum extiterit, cui mutatio illa tribui possit.