What Ames and Rutherford chiefly deny; the other side also grants a strong providence beyond general concurrence
From the reasons Ames and Rutherford give, it is clear that what they chiefly mean to deny, and shrink from as the gravest error, is that God's operation and efficacy concerning the creature's act consists in nothing more than a concurrence that is indifferent and indefinite in itself.
Those who otherwise hold that God's general concurrence, needed for each act of creatures, is indifferent in itself and variously determined by secondary causes have no intention whatever of asserting that. Besides that general concurrence of God, they recognize the great power and efficacy of divine providence in bringing about, furthering, regulating and directing all kinds of events, especially where human wills and the acts freely elicited by them are concerned. Strang points this out carefully in many places.
Latin
XLV. Caeterum ex rationibus ab Amesio & Retorforti allatis clarum est eos istud praecipue negatum velle, & tanquam maximum errorem abhorrere, quod non alia sit Dei circa creaturam actus operatio & efficacia, quam quae in concursu quodam ex se indifferenti & indefinito consistat. Quod certe minime affirmare intendunt omnes illi qui alioquin generalem Dei concursum, qui ad singulos actus creaturarum necessarius est, statuunt esse ex se indifferentem, & a causis secundis varie determinari. Quippe praeter illum Dei concursum generalem, agnoscunt magnam esse providentiae divinae vim & efficaciam, in variis rerum eventis procurandis, promovendis, moderandis atque dirigendis; & praesertim circa hominum Voluntates, & actus ab illis libere elicitos, quod Strangius multis in locis diligenter observat.