William Twisse distinguishes concurrence from predetermination and rejects the Jesuits' indifferent concurrence
The English theologian William Twisse distinguishes God's concurrence from his predetermination, though he thinks both necessary for every action of the creature. He grants that the concurrence is simultaneous with the creature's operation in both nature and time, but he insists that it is joined with a certain prior motion on the will itself.
'We too admit a concurrence on the act,' he says, 'simultaneous both in nature and in time; but we say that this concurrence involves a prior motion on the will itself, prior, I mean, not in time but in nature' (Vindiciae, book 2, part 3). In the same book, at page 18, he rejects an indifferent and undetermined concurrence of the kind the Jesuits teach: 'For my part I think it can be shown that this indifferent and indefinite concurrence is wrongly posited, as plainly as that the sun shines at noon.'
Latin
XLIV. Tuissus autem Theologus Anglus distinguit concursum Dei ab ejus praedeterminatione, licet utrumque necessarium putet ad omnes creaturae actiones. Et concursum quidem agnoscit esse simul & natura, & tempore cum operatione creaturae, sed vult ipsi adjunctam esse motionem quandam praeviam in ipsam voluntatem. Etiam concursum, inquit, admittimus simultaneum tam natura quam tempore in actum; sed concursum istum dicimus complicare motionem praeviam in ipsam Voluntatem, praeviam, inquam, non tempore, sed natura. Vindiciarum lib. 2. part. 3. Et in eodem lib. pag. 18. Concursum indifferentem & indeterminatum, qualem Jesuitae docent, his Verbis respuit, Ego vero concursum istum indifferentem atque indefinitum perperam institui tam evidenter demonstrari posse existimo, quam solem meridianum lucere.