Estius states the same and raises against himself the objection from freedom
What Estius writes in the passage cited above agrees with this. Having set out the same view and brought many arguments to support it, he concludes as follows and raises against himself the objection from the freedom of the human will:
'Since, then, what has been said makes it clear that our will is efficaciously moved and determined to its actions by God as first cause, first agent, mover and deliberator, and is therefore anticipated and predetermined by him, it remains to explain how the freedom of our will is consistent with that efficacious motion and determination, indeed with divine premotion and predetermination. For what a prior cause efficaciously moves and determines to one side does not seem to be left free to go either way.'
Latin
XXII. Atque his consentanea sunt quae leguntur apud Estium loco supra citato, ubi exposita eadem sententia, & multis in illius confirmationem adductis, sic concludit, & adversus voluntatis humanae libertatem sibi objicit, Cum igitur ex dictis pateat voluntatem nostram ad actiones suas efficaciter moveri & determinari a Deo tanquam prima causa, primoque agente, movente, deliberante, & proinde ab eo praeveniri ac praedeterminari, restat explicandum quomodo cum efficaci illa motione, ac determinatione, imo praemotione ac praedeterminatione divina, consistat libertas voluntatis nostrae. Non enim videtur relinqui liberum ad utrumlibet id quod a priori causa efficaciter movetur & determinatur in alteram partem.