Alvarez II.9: God premoves free choice to the act of sin as act and being; the malice is from the deficient will
The heading of chapter 9 reads: 'That God, by a prior motion, truly as an efficient cause or in the manner of a physical cause, premoves free choice to the act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being.'
The chapter opens: 'What has been said about the predetermination of the will to good acts must be extended to the act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being. Hence whatever being is found in any act of sin, even one otherwise intrinsically evil, must be traced back to God as the first cause who premoves and, by an actual motion, predetermines the created will to that act insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.'
Then, to show why it does not follow from God's being the first cause who premoves and predetermines the created will to an intrinsically evil act, such as blasphemy or hatred of God, that God causes the moral malice in such acts, he says this: the deformity of sin, or moral malice, does not follow intrinsically and by the nature of the case from the act of blasphemy or hatred of God in its essence as an act, nor as a being in the order of nature, even taken individually. It follows from the act as it comes from a created will that fails. The moral malice and the defect of sin must therefore be laid on the failing will, not on God.
Latin
XXI. Caput vero nonum hunc titulum praefert. Quod Deus praevia motione liberum arbitrium vere efficienter, sive ad modum causae Physicae, praemoveat ad actum peccati, in quantum actus, & ut ens est. Ipsum vero caput incipit his verbis, Quae dicta sunt de praedeterminatione Voluntatis ad actus bonos, extendi debent ad actum peccati, in quantum actus & ens est. Unde quicquid entitatis reperitur in quocunque actu peccati, etiamsi alias sit intrinsece malus, debet reduci in Deum, tanquam in primam causam praemoventem, & praedeterminantem actuali motione Voluntatem creatam ad talem actum, in quantum actus est, & secundum quod est ens. Postea vero ostensurus quomodo ex eo quod Deus est causa prima praemovens, & praedeterminans voluntatem creatam ad actum intrinsece malum, exempli gratia ad actum blasphemiae, aut odii in Deum, non sequitur Deum esse causam malitiae moralis quae talibus actibus inest, dicit deformitatem peccati, seu malitiam moralem non sequi intrinsece, & ex natura rei ad actum blasphemiae, vel odii Dei, secundum suam essentiam, ut actus est; neque ut est ens in genere naturae, etiam in individuo; sed ut procedit a voluntate creata deficiente; & ideo in voluntatem deficientem, & non in Deum, debere refundi malitiam moralem, & defectum peccati.