They do not say freedom is always joined to necessity; wayfarers have indifference, but freedom does not consist in it
Nor do they hold that freedom always comes with necessity, or that free choice, especially in man, is not indifferent and undetermined with regard to most of its acts.
They grant that people in this present life not only act freely but are so constituted that no natural necessity, or necessity strictly so called, binds them in acting. They can act or stop, do this or that, and perform opposite acts toward the same object.
What they deny is that freedom, considered simply, consists in that indifference and indeterminacy toward action or always goes with it. Freedom can remain and be kept without it, and it is sometimes found in one who is not indifferent at all but acts inevitably and unchangeably.
Latin
XXIII. Praeterea non est haec eorum sententia, libertati semper esse adjunctam necessitatem, neque liberum arbitrium, praecipue hominis, respectu plerorumque suorum actuum, esse indifferens & indeterminatum. Agnoscunt enim, homines, quamdiu in via sunt, non tantum agere libere, sed ita affectos esse, ut in agendo nulla naturali, sive proprie dicta necessitate teneantur, sed possint agere & ab agendo cessare, agere hoc aut illud, & circa idem objectum contrarios actus exercere. Sed putant libertatem simpliciter consideratam non consistere in ejusmodi ad agendum indifferentia, & indeterminatione, aut eam semper habere comitem; verum absque illa posse manere & conservari, & quandoque etiam in eo reperiri, qui nullo modo est ad agendum indifferens, sed inevitabiliter & immutabiliter agit.