To Florus 4.90
Enough of these matters. Let us now come to the point on which a large part of the case turns. Examined and drained of life by its force, the Manichaeans’ envoy has produced evidence of a reply as faithful as his talent is elegant. After praising and approving the words of mine I quoted above, with nothing new intervening, he approached the part in which the argument I had promised was completed. I had asked through what those whom God made were under the devil. I answered in his name, “Through sin, not through nature,” and replied in my own: “But, as you yourself agree, just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will. Do infants, then, possess a will at the time of conception, when they do not yet possess a soul? Or at the time of their birth, when they do not yet possess the use of reason?”
When he reached this point, he set out only this much of my objection: “But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will.” And he replied: “Indeed, that is so. For in this way ‘through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12). Through that one man’s evil will, all sinned in him, when all were that one man. For that reason, each inherited original sin from him” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15).
I therefore urge the reader to examine our contest attentively. What did you gain, most learned of two-footed creatures, by failing to complete my statement? Although the part you suppressed contained an explanation of the earlier statement, the whole force nevertheless remains equally in what you put before yourself. I faithfully set out your usual reply, as your own assent made clear. Asking through what infants whom God made were under the devil, I answered in your place, “Through sin, not through nature.” You certainly see that I practiced no deceit here. I said what is on the advocate of inherited sin’s lips, although it is not in his doctrine. To this I replied, “But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will.”
You broke this apart with shameless deceit. You mentioned my words that, just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will; but you suppressed what followed about the infants’ will. And you answer, “Indeed, that is so. For in this way ‘through one man sin entered the world’ (Romans 5:12): through that one man’s evil will, all sinned in him.” Is this answering? Is this arguing? Is this, finally, even showing a regard for sobriety? Learned people certainly laugh at the cleverness of sophisms, where shared words are used to trick the respondent’s simplicity. Yet those sophisms, though lacking the solidity of truth, are at least colored by an elegant surface. What sort of monstrosity of argument is this, which is neither solid with truth nor polished with sophistry? I certainly said that sin cannot exist without free will. Once that is granted, your doctrine is destroyed, since you think an offense exists in human nature without any will on the part of those held guilty.
Latin
Sed hinc ista sufficiant: veniamus nunc ad illud, in quo pars negotii magna versatur; cuius potentia examinatus et exanimatus Manichaeorum legatus, tam fidelis responsionis documenta protulit quam elegantis ingenii. Nam postquam dicta mea, quae supra posui, nulla re nova intercedente, laudavit et probavit, ad eam partem qua disputatio a nobis promissa supplebatur, accessit; quaerente me quippe, per quid sub diabolo essent, quos Deus fecit; ad quod respondi ipsius nomine: Per peccatum, non per naturam; et retuli de meo: Sed, sicut ipse annuis, ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Habent igitur tempore conceptus sui, parvuli voluntatem, qui adhuc animam non habent; aut habent tempore exortus sui, qui adhuc rationis usum non habent. Cum ad hunc igitur venisset locum, hoc solum de nostris proposuit obiectis, id est: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum; responditque: Ita vero, ita est; sic enim " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " [n132] . Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt, de quo propterea singuli peccatum originale traxerunt [n133] . Lectorem igitur adhortor, ut conflictum nostrum vigilanter inspiciat. Quid tibi profuit, eruditissime bipedum, meam non supplere sententiam; cum etsi in ea parte, quam suppressisti prioris dicti expositio teneretur, tamen etiam in illo, quod tibi obiecisti, vis aeque tota consistat? Proposui quippe fideliter, ut tua quoque manifestavit assensio, quod a te solet referri, et interrogans per quid sub diabolo essent parvuli, quos fecisset Deus, respondi vice tua: Per peccatum, non per naturam. Certe, vides me hinc nullam fecisse fraudem. Dixi quod in ore Traduciani est, licet hoc non sit in dogmate. Ad quod retuli: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Tu hoc impudenti fraude fecisti dividuum; nam commemorans quod nos dixeramus, quia ut non esset absque sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum; illud quod sequebatur de parvulorum voluntate tacuisti, et respondes: Ita vero, ita est; sic enim " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum " [n134] , per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt. Hoccine est respondere? Hoccine disputare est? Hoccine postremo vel sobrietatis habere respectum? Ridetur certe ab eruditis calliditas sophismatum, ubi per communionem nominum simplicitati respondentis illuditur; sed illa ipsa sophismata licet non sint veritate solida, urbana tamen superficie colorantur; hoc autem quod monstrum disputationis est, quod nec veritate solidum est, nec sophismate levigatum. Dixi certe non posse esse sine libera voluntate peccatum; quo concesso, vestrum dogma consumitur, qui putatis esse in natura hominum sine ulla voluntate reorum delictum.