To Florus 3.33
Now apply these examples to the case. Charging children with their parents’ sins and not charging children with their parents’ sins cannot both be shown equally just. If justice consists in holding the offspring guilty, it must be injustice to declare them not guilty for those same sins. And just as it is good to command justly, it is evil to give an unjust order. Argument may weaken the force of something already obvious, yet it is helpful to confirm an established case by the supporting judgments of divine law. Let us stay with this point: anyone who stands here with a sound mind will not be allowed to wander among the precipices of our present disputes.
You therefore concede, preacher of natural evil, that God’s law commands that children must not be punished for their parents’ sins. You also acknowledge that this people understood the command precisely as we now maintain it should be observed. Consequently King Amaziah, obeying God’s commands, restrained with praiseworthy moderation the anger caused by his father’s murder. He killed his father’s assassins but spared their sons, out of justice, not cowardice. Amaziah is praised; he is said to have done this according to God’s law, and commended for obeying the Lord’s will. Yet the account does not conceal that remnants of false worship stained him, and it shows that he did not imitate the devotion of his ancestor David (2 Kings 14:3–6). Even this man, who fell short of his family’s holiness, maintained in judgment the justice commended by divine law. Such was the power of reverence for unmistakable fairness! Consider, then, what evil your belief embraces: you attribute to God, whom we acknowledge as eternal, good, and just, an injustice that neither a king’s pride nor a bereaved son’s grief committed.
Latin
Ad causam itaque referantur exempla. Ut parentum peccata filiis imputentur et parentum peccata filiis non imputentur, non potest hoc utrumque contrarium pariter iustum probari; sed si iustitia est generantium subolem ream teneri, necesse est, ut iniustitia sit, si propter eadem peccata rea non esse dicatur; et sicut bonum est iuste praecipere, ita malum est iniuste quidquam iubere; et quamvis res perspicua argumentando levior fiat, tamen, quoniam causam in absoluto positam iuvat etiam legis divinae confirmare suffragiis, inhaereamus huic loco, in quo, quicumque sana mente constiterit, per praerupta quaestionum praesentium errare non sinitur. Acquiescis igitur, annuntiator naturalis mali, praescriptum esse lege Dei, ne filii puniantur in peccatis parentum; agnoscis etiam non aliter hoc praeceptum ab illo populo intellectum fuisse, quam a nobis nunc observandum defenditur. Et ideo regem Amessiam praeceptis Dei oboedientem indignationem, quam de patris sui internecione conceperat, laudabili moderatione frenasse atque occisis parentis sui percussoribus eorum tamen filiis non per ignaviam, sed per iustitiam pepercisse. Laudatur quidem Amessias et hoc secundum Dei refertur fecisse legem commendaturque oboedisse voluntati Domini, sed tamen infuscatus vanitatis reliquiis non tacetur et ostenditur devotionem David patris sui imitatus non esse [n38] . Hic tamen ab illa generis sui sanctitate degenerans tenuit in iudicio commendatam divina lege iustitiam; tantum reverentia perspicuae aequitatis valebat. Quid ergo mali fides tua complectatur, expende: hanc iniquitatem Deo admoves, quem aeternum et pium et iustum fatemur, quam nec superbia purpurati nec dolor commisit orbati.