Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology · §26

Bright's fifth opinion is confuted

Article XIV. Bright's fifth opinion is confuted.

1. As I was finishing this disputation, Timothy Bright of Cambridge's On Health, Disease, and Death came to hand, with a new opinion on the soul's origin. He answers: neither the whole nor a part of the parents' mind is translated, nor is some accident a mind-rudiment. What then? A substance born from the soul — neither whole nor part — as an immortal seed of the soul, principle of the offspring's future soul. As corporeal seed cut from the parents' bodies is neither the body nor a member, so the soul is translated through a fertile soul-seed, not through the soul or a part of it. The integral soul is referred to the parents as received; but something seminal is shut out from soul as from body, and by the blessing of fertility goes forth into a rational immortal soul.

2. First confutation: that spiritual seed truly pre-existed in the parent's soul — real emission presupposes real inherence — yet it cannot really inhere there, so cannot be really emitted. Not as part in whole (Bright admits); not as accident in a subject (it is a substance); not as in a surrounding place or vessel (repugnant to the soul's spiritual nature).

3. Second: the spiritual seed comes from the whole father's soul, or a part, or nothing. Not from corporeal matter — it is spiritual, and Bright says it is born from soul not body. Not from the whole soul (the whole would convert into seed); not from a part (the soul is indivisible). So from nothing — which is creation.

4. Third: conversion of that seed into a soul is accidental or substantial. Not accidental: then it would differ from the soul only by degree of accidental perfection — an inchoate imperfect rational soul — contradicting Bright's claim that it is not actually a soul but a principle of a future soul. If substantial, it happens by abolishing the whole, or one part of the essence while the other remains.

5. Fourth: God could annihilate that seed and in the same instant produce a soul from nothing; then production belongs to God alone, not the father — a huge absurdity if their traducian doctrine is true.

6. Fifth: conversion cannot abolish one essential part while another remains. That would make the spiritual seed-substance corruptible and capable of substantial change like physical bodies; and would make it composed of physical matter and form or essential parts — for only of those is it true that when one is destroyed the other can remain in actual existence.

7. Sixth: if the spiritual seed converts into a soul, generation cannot occur without the seed's perishing; yet the seed's form (the soul) would remain, and substantial conversion requires the prior form's perishing. So Bright's opinion is no safer than the preceding.

Latin

ART. XIV. Confutatur quinta sententia, quae est Timothei Bright Cantabrigiensis. 1. Cum extremam manum huic disputationi admovebam, cum acutissimi Timothei Brighti Cantabrigiensis librum de Sanitate, de Morbo, & de Morte, in manus meas incidit; in quo ille novam & insolitam sententiam de origine animae proponit. Verba ejus haec sunt: Quibus respondemus, nec totam, nec partem animi parentum traduci, neque accidens aliquod animi rudimentum esse. Quid ergo? Sane substantiam quandam ab anima natam, nec totam ipsam nec partem, tanquam animae immortale semen, prolis animae futurae principium: & sicut semen corporeum de parentum corporibus decisum nec corpus ipsum, nec corporis aliquod membrum emittit, ita anima per semen animae fecundum, non per animam aut animae partem aliquam, traducitur in prolem: & paulo post, Ergo tenemus, animam ut integram & absolutam parentibus referendam acceptam; sed seminale quid ab anima, aeque atque a corpore exclusum, & tandem verbi illius virtute (sc. foecunditatis benedictione) in animam rationalem & immortalem proditurum. 2. Hanc sententiam clarissimi & doctissimi Timothei sic confuto. Primo: Spiritus ille seu semen spirituale, quod a parentis anima excluditur & emittitur, vere & realiter praeexistebat in anima: realis enim emissio praesupponit reale inesse; at spiritus ille non potest realiter inesse animae parentis: Ergo neque realiter excludi & emitti ab ea. Probatur assumptio: spiritus ille non potest inesse animae patris ut pars in toto, fatente ipso Timotheo; neque ut accidens in subjecto, idque quia est substantia; substantiae autem repugnat inesse subjecto; neque ut res in loco ambiente, aut in vase continente — talis enim modus continentiae & circumscriptionis naturae spirituali animae repugnat. 3. Secundo: semen illud spirituale vel fit ex tota anima patris, vel ex parte animae patris, vel ex nihilo: non enim potest fieri ex materia corporea, tum quia est spiritualis substantia, tum quia ipse Brightus testatur illud non ex corpore sed ex anima natum esse: non fit ex tota anima patris, quia sic anima patris tota in semen converteretur; non ex parte, quia anima est indivisibilis; Ergo ex nihilo — quod creationem importat. 4. Tertio: conversio illius seminis spiritualis in animam vel est conversio accidentalis, qualis est conversio seu mutatio qua homo malus convertitur & mutatur in bonum, & color albus in nigrum; vel est conversio substantialis, qualis fuit conversio uxoris Loth in statuam salis, & conversio ligni in substantiam illius ignis cui approximatur. Non est conversio accidentalis, quia inde sequeretur semen illud spirituale non differre specie & essentialiter, sed gradu perfectionis accidentalis, ab anima — hoc est, esse animam rationalem accidentali aliqua ratione inchoatam & imperfectam: hoc autem contradicit verbis ipsius Timothei, dicentis semen illud non esse actu animam sed animae futurae principium. Si vero est conversio substantialis, tunc vel fit per abolitionem totius, vel per abolitionem unius partis essentiae altera remanente. 5. Quarto: DEUS valeat semen illud annihilare, & eo annihilato animam eodem instanti ex nihilo producere; non patri sed DEO soli tunc animae productio adscribenda est — quod ingens absurdum est, si vera sit ipsorum doctrina de traduce. 6. Quinto: conversio seminis in animam non potest fieri per abolitionem unius partis essentiae, altera remanente: primo, quia inde sequeretur spiritualem substantiam seminis illius esse corruptibilem & capacem transmutationis substantialis, non minus quam corpora Physica; illa enim aboleri & destrui possunt naturaliter quoad unam solam essentiae partem, formam videlicet: secundo, sequeretur substantiam illam spiritualem esse compositam ex materia & forma Physica, aut in partes essentiales — nam de his solis verum est quod earum una destructa altera remanere possit superstes quoad actualem existentiam. 7. Sexto: generationem hominis fieri sine interitu seminis non potest, si semen illud spirituale in animam convertitur; forma enim seminis, i.e. anima, maneret — at conversio substantialis interitum prioris formae requirit. Unde concludo Brighti sententiam non magis tutam esse quam praecedentes.

About this text

Robert Baron, Philosophia Theologiae Ancillans (Philosophy in Service to Theology): the first exercise, on being and essence, and the second, on the origin of the soul and the spread of sin — newly rendered from Latin. Later exercises are not in this volume.

English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.